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1796 
Article 
Adaptive Federalism: The Case Against 
Reallocating Environmental Regulatory 
Authority 
David E. Adelman† and Kirsten H. Engel†† 
A hallmark of environmental federalism is that neither 
federal nor state governments limit themselves to what many 
legal scholars have deemed to be their appropriate domains. 
The federal government continues to regulate local issues, such 
as remediation of contaminated industrial sites, which have 
few direct interstate connections and few benefits from federal 
uniformity. At the same time, state and local governments are 
not content to confine their attention to issues of local concern, 
but are developing policies on environmental issues of national 
or even international scale, such as global climate change. Nor 
do environmental issues “stay” in the control of any particular 
level of government, but rather tend to pass back and forth be-
tween them like the proverbial football. 
The current system of environmental federalism is thus a 
dynamic one of overlapping federal and state jurisdiction. This 
dynamic system is threatened, however, by federal legislation 
and Supreme Court rulings. A wave of preemptive legislation 
has emerged from Congress in recent years.1 For example, an 
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 1. PAUL TESKE, REGULATION IN THE STATES 4–5 (2004) (enumerating 
preemptive federal statutes and noting that “more federal preemptions have 
occurred in recent decades than over the rest of U.S. history”). In addition, 
several federal agencies have recently claimed in the preambles to regulations 
in the Federal Register that their regulatory actions preempt state statutory 
and common law. William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemp-
tion, and the Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1573 (2007).  
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early version of an energy bill now pending in Congress would 
have preempted state actions to reduce greenhouse gas emis-
sions that contribute to climate change.2 Numerous other bills 
would preempt state action on issues related to climate change 
and energy efficiency.3 At the same time, the Supreme Court 
has not hesitated to preempt state auto pollution regulations, 
despite, at best, ambiguous statutory language.4 Such decisions 
 
 2. See Edmund L. Andrews, Auto Chiefs Make Headway Against a Mi-
leage Increase, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2007, at C1 (reporting that a House bill 
would prevent the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) from authorizing 
states to regulate vehicle greenhouse gas emissions, thus preempting rules 
promulgated by California and adopted by other states). The two powerful 
House sponsors, Representatives John Dingell and Rick Boucher, ultimately 
abandoned the preemption effort. California Congressional Leaders Defeat Ef-
fort to Preempt State’s Climate Change Legislation, CAL. CAPITOL HILL BULL. 
(Cal. Inst. for Fed. Pol’y Res., Wash., D.C.), June 22, 2007, at 6, available at 
http://www.calinst.org/2007Bullpdf.shtml. 
 3. See, e.g., H.R. 2927, 110th Cong. § 2(a) (2007) (preempting any state 
law or regulation on consumer tire fuel efficiency information that is different 
from requirements imposed by the Department of Transportation); Alternative 
Fuel Standard Act of 2007, S. 1158, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007) (preempting state 
and local laws and regulations relating to the renewable or alternative energy 
content of fuels when the Administrator of the EPA issues a waiver during an 
“extreme or unusual fuel supply circumstance”); Gasoline for America’s Secu-
rity Act of 2005, H.R. 3893, 109th Cong. §§ 101, 102, 107 (as presented in 
House, Oct. 7, 2005) (preempting state authority regarding the siting and op-
eration of oil refineries on federal lands within a state and authorizing the es-
tablishment of a Federal Fuels List of approved fuels and blends); Engine Coo-
lant and Antifreeze Bittering Agent Act of 2005, S. 1110, 109th Cong. § 2 
(2005) (preempting state or local laws that impose requirements different from 
that of the federal government relating to the inclusion of a bittering agent in 
retail engine coolant or antifreeze). A review of bills currently pending before 
Congress reveals a heated debate over preemption; several bills on similar top-
ics expressly reject preemption. See Carbon-Neutral Government Act of 2007, 
H.R. 2635, 110th Cong. § 104 (2007) (“Nothing in this Act . . . shall be inter-
preted to preempt or limit the authority of a State to take any action to ad-
dress global warming.”); Future Fuels Act, H.R. 2296, 110th Cong. § 304(d)(6) 
(2007) (“Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to preempt State law relat-
ing to higher fuel economy standards applicable to replacement tires designed 
for use on passenger cars and trucks.”); H.R. 2215, 110th Cong., § 711 (2007) 
(adding a title to the Clean Air Act providing a reduction in greenhouse gas 
emissions from vehicles and aircraft and stating that “nothing in this title 
shall be interpreted to preempt or limit State actions to address climate 
change”). 
 4. Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 
258–59 (2004) (holding that section 209(a) of the Clean Air Act preempts Cali-
fornia regulations prohibiting the purchase or lease by various public and pri-
vate fleet operators of vehicles that do not comply with stringent emission re-
quirements); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States When It 
Matters: A Different Approach to Preemption, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1313, 1314–
15 (2004). 
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follow a long line of cases in which the Court has preempted a 
variety of state actions designed to protect the public.5 
This dynamic system is also antithetical to the prevailing 
economic orthodoxy of federalism scholars. Legal academics 
have long maintained that an optimal level of government ex-
ists for regulating a given environmental problem. The ortho-
dox view, which we refer to as the “matching principle,” is pre-
mised on the elementary economic theory that efficient 
regulation is possible only when the regulating entity fully in-
ternalizes the costs and benefits of its policies.6 A corollary of 
this principle is that the regulatory authority should reside at 
the level of government that roughly “matches” the geographic 
scope of the subject environmental problem. Hence regulation 
of intrastate groundwater ought to be regulated by state and 
local governments,7 whereas climate change should be ad-
dressed at the international level. This static model is incom-
patible with the existing dynamic system, as it precludes over-
lapping and shifting regulatory authority between the states 
and federal government. 
We reject the traditional static optimization model for an 
adaptive one. Our approach draws on an emerging trend in le-
 
 5. E.g., Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) (addressing the 
disclosure of insurance policies sold in Europe between 1920 and 1945); Loril-
lard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) (cigarette smoking); Geier v. 
Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000) (state tort law).  
 6. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmen-
tal Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 130, 157 (2005) (arguing that the divi-
sion of authority in environmental law is inefficient as it fails to comport with 
an analytical framework that reserves issues of national scope to the federal 
government and issues of local effect to state governments); Henry N. Butler & 
Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle: The Case for 
Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 
23, 25 (1996) (“The Matching Principle suggests that, in general, the size of 
the geographic area affected by a specific pollution source should determine 
the appropriate governmental level for responding to the pollution. There is no 
need for the regulating jurisdiction to be larger than the regulated activity.”); 
Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 
587 (1996) (“Whenever the scope of an environmental harm does not match 
the regulator’s jurisdiction, the cost-benefit calculus will be skewed and either 
too little or too much environmental protection will be provided.”); Richard O. 
Zerbe, Optimal Environmental Jurisdictions, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 193, 245 (1974) 
(“[W]hile the arguments show the case for local jurisdiction [over environmen-
tal regulation] to be strong, important exceptions remain . . . . where there is 
undue political influence at local levels, where there is sufficient interjurisdic-
tional pollution, and where technological considerations give substantially 
greater efficiency to larger jurisdictions.”). 
 7. Adler, supra note 6, at 135 (“[M]ost environmental problems are local 
or regional.”). 
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gal scholarship that calls for a dynamic model of federalism.8 
We start with the unremarkable observation that environmen-
tal problems are multifaceted. Sources of environmental harm 
may be the manifestation of numerous failures, market as well 
as regulatory, that arise along numerous dimensions and at 
widely variant temporal and spatial scales. Further, the initia-
tive to address environmental problems will originate from 
more than one level of government based upon a variety of po-
litical, socioeconomic, and environmental factors, each differing 
from the other in the mix of these variables.9 This diversity of 
contexts proves to be an essential asset in a complex and dy-
namic world. 
The simplicity of the matching principle, in this light, 
comes at a significant price because it assumes away much of 
the inherent complexity of environmental problems. Further, 
the static nature of the matching principle’s economic model 
ignores the constantly shifting landscape in which environmen-
tal policy is set, with its disruptions from both natural 
processes and human interventions.10 Rigid adherence to the 
 
 8. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 1329; Renee M. Jones, Dy-
namic Federalism: Competition, Cooperation and Securities Enforcement, 11 
CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 109 (2004); Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism: 
State Constitutions in the Federal Courts, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1409, 1411–13 
(1999). 
 9. The divergent stands that states have taken on regulating greenhouse 
gases reflect this variation, with some states seeking to regulate them aggres-
sively (e.g., California, Oregon, New Jersey) and others formally opposing the 
Kyoto Protocol and, in at least one case, barring state regulators from working 
with the EPA on voluntary climate-change programs. Tom Arrandale, The Pol-
lution Puzzle, GOVERNING, Aug. 2002, at 22, 23; see also Brian J. Gerber & 
Paul Teske, Regulatory Policymaking in the American States: A Review of 
Theories and Evidence, 53 POL. RES. Q. 849, 856 (2000) (“[S]tates vary consi-
derably in terms of their populations, political cultures, and political institu-
tions.”); Matthew Potoski, Clean Air Federalism: Do States Race to the Bot-
tom?, 61 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 335, 338–39 (2001) (finding a correlation between 
the “political climate” in a state and whether a state enacts more stringent 
standards than mandated by the EPA under the Clean Air Act); Evan J. Ring-
quist & David H. Clark, Issue Definition and the Politics of State Environmen-
tal Justice Policy Adoption, 25 INT’L J. PUB. ADMIN. 351, 364 (2002) (“[T]he 
general political and economic characteristics of a state exert terrific influence 
over the type of policies that a state will adopt.”). 
 10. For example, rigorous fire suppression appeared to be a logical policy 
for many years, but it gradually became evident that fire serves an important 
ecological function, so policy shifted to embrace prescribed burns. However, in 
part because of this earlier policy, human development had extended into 
many forested regions, raising the stakes of prescribed burns. See, e.g., Wil-
liam L. Baker, Restoration of Landscape Structure Altered by Fire Suppres-
sion, 8 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 763, 767 (1994) (asserting that extensive pe-
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matching principle, we will show, is counterproductive in such 
an environment because it increases the risks of freezing poli-
cies in local maxima (dead ends) and decreases responsiveness 
to changing environmental conditions.  
We will use ecosystems, one of the best-known adaptive 
systems, as an exemplar of our adaptive model.11 Ecosystems 
embody two seemingly incompatible processes: (1) weeding out 
less-fit organisms, in essence a process of biological optimiza-
tion, and (2) maintenance of the biological diversity essential to 
long-term adaptability to environmental change.12 Adaptive 
systems sustain these dueling objectives by operating on mul-
tiple geographic and temporal scales, such that environmental 
conditions are aggregated at different levels and along different 
dimensions.13 These basic characteristics already exist in the 
federal system. We will argue they are essential to sustaining 
innovative and responsive environmental policymaking. 
To avert any misperceptions, we renounce two of the more 
extreme implications of our adaptive model. We do not believe 
that a single model can account for all aspects of the federal 
system or, for that matter, the many legal doctrines that it im-
plicates. Our use of adaptive systems, and ecosystems in par-
ticular, as a model for federalism does not presume—and we do 
not maintain—that adaptive systems are inherently norma-
tive.14 We argue that an adaptive model of federalism is well 
 
riods of fire suppression may require a return to the presettlement fire regime 
in order to restore landscape structures).  
 11. Here we draw upon an example from the natural world as a repository 
of the characteristics that contribute to the successful maintenance of a sys-
tem over long time periods and in the face of change. In doing so, we use natu-
ral adaptive systems in a manner similar to the use of evolution in the work of 
E. Donald Elliott and others on the evolution of environmental statutes. E. 
Donald Elliott et al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federaliza-
tion of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313, 314–15 (1985) (modeling 
development of environmental statutes using evolution as a metaphor for in-
fluences of the political and organizational environment). 
 12. Simon A. Levin, Complex Adaptive Systems: Exploring the Known, the 
Unknown and the Unknowable, 40 BULL. AM. MATHEMATICAL SOC. 3, 5–6 
(2002) (observing that in complex adaptive systems, “[t]he winnowing of varia-
tion must be balanced against the appearance of new variation; else the sys-
tems will run down”). 
 13. C.S. Holling, From Complex Regions to Complex Worlds, 7 MINN. J.L. 
SCI. & TECH. 1, 2–4 (2005); Levin, supra note 12, at 4 (pointing out that “[nat-
ural] selection is manifest on multiple interacting scales”). 
 14. The multilevel structure of an adaptive model also mirrors the current 
system of environmental federalism. But one must be careful not to take the 
analogy too far. Clearly, many features of the federal system have no analogue 
in the natural world. Ecosystems, for instance, have nothing akin to a national 
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suited to the complexity of the problems native to environmen-
tal policy. Nor do we believe that an adaptive model captures 
everything worth saying about environmental federalism. To 
the contrary, we accept that the matching principle has its me-
rits, particularly generality and simplicity (although its accura-
cy is often seriously wanting). Instead, we intend to show that 
an adaptive model is superior to the matching principle as an 
organizing framework for environmental federalism. 
An adaptive model also represents an important concep-
tual advance. It fills a void in the legal literature by providing a 
robust theoretical grounding for dynamic federalism, which to 
date has been justified primarily on the basis of its capacity to 
generate a diverse range of policies and to protect state auton-
omy.15 Further, while an adaptive model reinforces many as-
pects of the existing framework for environmental federalism, 
it calls for several key doctrinal and legislative principles that 
would provide an antidote to the troubling rise in assertions of 
federal preemption by Congress and the courts. These prescrip-
tions include adopting a judicial presumption and a correspond-
ing principle of legislative drafting against federal preemption. 
The model also calls for a more specific presumption against 
federal regulations that preclude states from establishing more 
stringent standards.16 We further advocate tempering uniform 
federal standards by allowing a small number of competing 
state standards. 
The Article is organized into three parts. Part I reviews the 
legal literature on environmental federalism and the emerging 
support for a dynamic model of federalism. Part II describes the 
 
government with hierarchical authority over their subdivisions, and natural 
systems are not “designed” to achieve societal ideals, such as justice or eco-
nomic efficiency. As we will show, these differences do not diminish the value 
of an adaptive model; its basic structure is uniquely suited to sustaining a di-
verse range of environmental policy options and processes for winnowing and 
refining them that a federal system would do well to duplicate. 
 15. See Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 1315–16; Erwin Chemerinsky, Em-
powering States: The Need to Limit Federal Preemption, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 69, 
74–75 (2005) [hereinafter Chemerinsky, Empowering States]; Jones, supra 
note 8, at 107; Schapiro, supra note 8, at 1411–13; Robert A. Schapiro, Justice 
Stevens’s Theory of Interactive Federalism, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2133, 2135 
(2006) [hereinafter Schapiro, Justice Stevens]; Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a 
Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 248–50 (2005) [herein-
after Schapiro, Interactive Federalism]. 
 16. See Pietro S. Nivola, Does Federalism Have a Future?, PUB. INTEREST, 
Winter 2001, at 44, 46 (noting the prevalence of federal preemption and ob-
serving that businesses seek “compulsory ceilings on the possible excesses of 
zealous states”). 
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basic features of an adaptive system and explains how our 
adaptive model differs from the static model that underlies the 
matching principle, as well as existing dynamic theories. Part 
III advocates three new legal presumptions and legislative 
principles designed to sustain the dynamic attributes of envi-
ronmental federalism. It concludes with two examples—
brownfields regulation and climate change—to illustrate the 
benefits of a federal structure that contemplates dynamic and 
overlapping federal-state regulatory jurisdiction. 
I.  THE ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM DEBATE   
The debate over environmental federalism is very much in 
flux.17 Two schools of thought, which we will refer to as “clas-
sical” and “dynamic” federalism, dominate the current debate. 
The classical school is largely defined by its commitment to the 
matching principle as a means of selecting the level of govern-
ment at which an environmental problem should be regu-
lated.18 The dynamic school prizes governmental regulatory au-
tonomy, the virtues of multiple regulatory approaches, and the 
benefits of a dynamic give-and-take among regulatory officials 
across different jurisdictions.19 Both conceptions raise chal-
lenges to the system of cooperative federalism that dominates 
environmental law in the United States. 
Calls for devolving environmental regulation to the states 
figure prominently in this discourse. Devolution emerged as a 
rallying cry among mostly conservative scholars and political 
activists in the 1990s,20 and it was initially embraced by the 
 
 17. Wallace E. Oates & Paul R. Portney, The Political Economy of Envi-
ronmental Policy, in 1 HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 326, 346 
(Karl-Göran Mäler & Jeffrey R. Vincent eds., 2003) (“Environmental federal-
ism thus remains a highly contentious issue, both in terms of theory and prac-
tice.”). 
 18. The term “matching principle” is a relatively recent one in the federal-
ism literature, as it was first coined in a 1996 article. Butler & Macey, supra 
note 6, at 25 (suggesting a “Matching Principle,” according to which “the size 
of the geographic area affected by a specific pollution source would determine 
the appropriate governmental level for responding to the pollution,” and as-
serting that “[t]here is no need for the regulating jurisdiction to be larger than 
the regulated activity”). For a similar view, see Adler, supra note 6, at 157.  
 19. Schapiro, Interactive Federalism, supra note 15, at 285–88.  
 20. As one commentator has observed, support and opposition to devolu-
tion  
shows some interesting contradictions. Most generally, conservatives 
hoped that the combination of federal deregulation and devolution of 
powers to the states would lead to a greatly reduced regulatory role at 
both levels. Instead, federal deregulation and reduced social regulato-
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administration of George W. Bush.21 The Bush administration 
soon backtracked, though, and sought both to centralize control 
over environmental policymaking at the federal level and to 
preempt state initiatives.22 We believe this move has gone too 
far. 
In the Sections that follow, we examine both schools of fed-
eralism and describe the evolution of the environmental feder-
alism debate. Although the classical school currently has the 
upper hand, the dynamic school is challenging long-held as-
sumptions and gaining ground. We also address the distinctive 
position of cooperative federalism, which incorporates elements 
of dynamic federalism into a classical regime, in the pantheon 
of federalism scholarship. 
A. CONFLICTING PERSPECTIVES ON STATIC MODELS OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM 
The modern scholarly debate over environmental federal-
ism focuses on the proper allocation of regulatory authority be-
tween the states and the federal government. It begins with a 
very simple insight: regulation would be inefficient if its costs 
and benefits were not fully internalized by the regulating au-
thority. The matching principle emerges naturally from this 
static economic argument.23 
Early scholarship followed a framework set forth by Ri-
chard Stewart. He argued that while state regulation should be 
 
ry enforcement created a gap that some state actors have moved to 
fill. And while conservatives generally applaud the idea of different 
state and local jurisdictions pursuing different policy approaches, 
they get quite concerned when one or a few states or local jurisdic-
tions are able to leverage their policies into, in effect, national poli-
cies. On the other hand, from the historical lessons of segregation pol-
icies by the states, halted only by federal policy intervention, many 
liberals retain strong skepticism about state policymaking even in an 
era when it often seems to their advantage, at least in regulatory pol-
icy.  
TESKE, supra note 1, at 238. 
 21. Barry Rabe, Environmental Policy and the Bush Era: The Collision 
Between the Administrative Presidency and State Experimentation, 37 PUB-
LIUS 413, 413 (2007). 
 22. Id. at 421 (observing that the Bush administration has imposed nu-
merous “federal rules and mandates that expanded the state government 
workload and narrowed its ability to pursue priorities”). 
 23. See supra note 6 and accompanying text; see also Oates & Portney, 
supra note 17, at 342 (observing that a central tenet of environmental econom-
ics “is that the responsibility for providing a particular service should be 
placed with the smallest jurisdiction whose boundaries encompass the various 
benefits and costs associated with the provision of the service”). 
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preferred, important exceptions exist to this traditional model 
of federalism.24 In line with the matching principle, Stewart 
claimed that environmental regulation should be elevated to 
the federal level when local decision makers would not inter-
nalize all of the costs and benefits of regulatory action or inac-
tion (for example, interstate water or air pollution spillovers).25 
Stewart further argued that federal regulation was appropriate 
for certain intrastate environmental problems. State standards, 
he argued, might be suboptimally lax due to the influence of 
powerful interest groups—so-called public-choice problems—or 
to competition between states for mobile industries that preci-
pitate a “race to the bottom” in standard setting among 
states.26 
Stewart’s economic framework inspired a generation of 
writing on environmental federalism, and virtually every ele-
ment of it has been dissected. The theoretical bases upon which 
he argued for federal regulation of intrastate environmental 
harms, however, have been the most controversial. The race-to-
the-bottom hypothesis and the relative importance of public-
choice dynamics at the state and federal levels have received 
most of the attention.27 While initially accepted as dogma, both 
theories have come under close scrutiny, and some scholars 
now claim that neither interstate competition nor public-choice 
 
 24. Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in 
Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE 
L.J. 1196, 1210 (1977). Stewart’s preference for local decision making was 
broader than simple cost-internalization, and included the opportunity to reap 
the benefits of policy experimentation and nonutilitarian values of self-
determination. Id. at 1215–16. 
 25. Id. at 1215. 
 26. Id. at 1210 (“As a nation, we have traditionally favored noncentralized 
decisions regarding the use and development of the physical environment.”); 
see also Butler & Macey, supra note 6, at 25 (“[T]he size of the geographic area 
affected by a specific pollution source should determine the appropriate go-
vernmental level for responding to the pollution . . . . [W]hen a particular pol-
luting activity is limited to a particular locality or state, there is very little jus-
tification for federal environmental regulation.”); Richard L. Revesz, 
Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Ra-
tionale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1222 
(1992) (“Given our system of federalism, in which state and local governments 
have broad police powers, and in which, throughout most of our history, they 
have had primary responsibility for health-and-safety regulation, there ought 
to be an affirmative justification for federal intervention.”). 
 27. See, e.g., Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is 
There a “Race” and Is It “to-the-Bottom”?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 274–76 
(1997); Revesz, supra note 26, at 1210–12; Zerbe, supra note 6, at 245. 
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dynamics support a reversal of the traditional preference for 
state-level regulation.28 
The race to the bottom is an exception to the matching 
principle that, depending on its prevalence, could transform 
that principle from the rule to the exception. In a regulatory 
race to the bottom, states will sacrifice environmental stan-
dards to attract new industries to their jurisdiction, just as 
they lure companies through direct economic incentives such as 
tax breaks.29 This strategy makes state regulations suboptimal 
even with respect to fully internalized, intrastate environmen-
tal problems, such as protection of groundwater or land use 
controls.30 A principal point of disagreement is whether state 
environmental standard setting is best characterized by static 
models of perfect competition, in which case state standards 
will be efficient,31 or by a game-theoretic model of the “Prison-
er’s Dilemma,” in which case state standards will be suboptim-
al.32  
The importance of public-choice dynamics is similarly con-
tested. Most scholars agree that political processes tend to gen-
erate suboptimally lax environmental regulation and that this 
bias exists in large part because diffuse environmental inter-
ests are out-lobbied by more concentrated and powerful busi-
ness interests.33 Little consensus exists, however, over whether 
 
 28. Adler, supra note 6, at 157 (arguing that the division of authority in 
environmental law is inefficient as it fails to comport with an analytical 
framework that reserves issues of national scope to the federal government 
and issues of local effect to state governments); Butler & Macey, supra note 6, 
at 25; Revesz, supra note 26, at 1238–42 (arguing that the race-to-the-bottom 
rationale for federal regulation of intrastate environmental issues is unsup-
ported and federal regulation in such contexts inefficient). 
 29. Engel, supra note 27, at 275.  
 30. Id. 
 31. See Revesz, supra note 26, at 1238–42. Applying a model developed by 
economists Wallace Oates and Robert Schwab, Revesz argues that regulators 
choose environmental standards and capital rates that maximize the utility of 
their residents. He assumes, among other things, that the number of partici-
pants in the market for industrial firms is sufficiently large that no single de-
cision maker is able to influence the actions of any other decision maker. Id. 
 32. Engel, supra note 27, at 314–15, 356–59 (analogizing states to the 
prisoners in game theory’s “prisoner’s dilemma,” and contending that one 
state’s environmental choices are not immunized from the influence of other 
states and hence, left to their own devices, states may establish suboptimal 
environmental standards in an interstate regulatory race to the bottom).  
 33. See Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A 
Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 571 n.95 (2001) (listing sources 
that discuss the powerful business lobby); see also Gerber & Teske, supra note 
9, at 862–63 (observing that studies “definitely show that interest group pres-
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the size of the power disparity between environmentalists and 
business interests differs between the state and federal levels 
of government. The traditional view favors federal regulation 
because the achievable economies of scale in organizing at the 
federal level might mitigate coordination disadvantages faced 
by environmental groups.34 Revisionist thinking counters that 
there is no inherent reason to believe that public-choice pathol-
ogies affecting environmental regulation will be any worse or 
better at the state versus the federal level.35  
Other scholars have avoided such generalizations altogeth-
er in favor of a highly contextual, case-by-case approach to ap-
plying the matching principle. Professor Dan Esty, for instance, 
argues for a multifactor approach that considers the particular 
ecological or public health harms, technical complexity, time 
lags, threshold effects, and influence of special interest 
groups.36 Esty further recognizes that a seemingly simple envi-
ronmental problem may itself have multiple dimensions, some 
of which are best addressed at the national level while others 
call for local control.37 He argues that in such circumstances, 
regulatory responsibility should be divided between different 
levels of government.38 Esty’s primary objective is nevertheless 
to identify the “optimal fit” between the scope of an environ-
mental problem and the regulating entity. In essence, Esty’s 
approach is a more nuanced application of the matching prin-
ciple. Its most distinctive features include rejection of presump-
tions in favor of one level of government over another and a wil-
lingness to disaggregate environmental problems.39  
 
sure shapes state regulation,” but interest group “influence may vary by state 
 . . . as interest group power in particular industries . . . and interest group 
density generally . . . vary”). 
 34. Esty, supra note 6, at 650–51; Stewart, supra note 24, at 1213. 
 35. Revesz, supra note 33, at 578. Indeed, recent assessments of lobbying 
at the state level suggest that “the stakes in state policy are high enough that 
they are now inundated with requests from interest groups to develop favora-
ble public policies.” TESKE, supra note 1, at 203. There are now “five registered 
state lobbyists for every state legislator” for a total of “37,000 registered lobby-
ing organizations at the state level”; collectively, those organizations spent one 
billion dollars in 2000. Id. 
 36. Esty, supra note 6, at 652; see also Daniel C. Esty, Toward Optimal 
Environmental Governance, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1495, 1554–56 (1999) [herein-
after Esty, Governance]. 
 37. Esty, Governance, supra note 36, at 1555. 
 38. Id. 
 39. More recently, Esty seems to be leaning more toward a dynamic model 
that reflects the “diversity and complexity of the world” and “requires a flexi-
ble mix of competition and cooperation between government actors as well as 
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The classical school of environmental federalism provides a 
simple framework that draws on standard economic metrics to 
determine the level of government at which regulation should 
take place. As discussed above, this simplicity has proved to be 
superficial. Scholars have unearthed a number of complicating 
theoretical and empirical pitfalls, which are hotly contested 
even among the classical school’s adherents. Deeper problems 
lurk beyond the debate within the classical framework. Most 
importantly, the classical school ignores the benefits of concur-
rent jurisdiction by state and federal authorities, as well as the 
characteristics of environmental problems that belie efforts to 
identify the single “efficient” level of government from which to 
regulate.40  
B. RISING SUPPORT FOR A DYNAMIC CONCEPTION OF 
FEDERALISM 
Against the backdrop of the classical debate, a new trend 
in federalism scholarship is emerging that is alternatively re-
ferred to as “empowerment federalism,”41 “polyphonic federal-
ism,”42 “interactive federalism,”43 “dynamic federalism,”44 and 
 
between government and non-governmental actors, along both horizontal and 
vertical dimensions.” Daniel C. Esty & Damien Geradin, Regulatory Co-
Opetition, 3 J. INT’L ECON. L. 235, 235 (2000). 
 40. Interestingly, although arguing that efficiency calls for standard set-
ting by one or the other level of government, scholars within this school none-
theless recognize some of the many examples in which the level of government 
presumed to be efficient has failed in practice to live up to expectations. For 
instance, Richard Revesz has extensively criticized both the design and the 
implementation of the federal statutory provisions for reducing interstate air 
and water pollution spillovers. Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate 
Environmental Externalities, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2341, 2342–47 (1996); see also 
Adler, supra note 6, at 162; Rena I. Steinzor, EPA and Its Sisters at 30: Devo-
lution, Revolution, or Reform?, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 11,086, 11,092 (2001). Yet, 
rather than viewing these examples as a reason to question either the general 
assumption that each environmental problem can be correlated with an opti-
mizing level of government or that their chosen level is the correct one, these 
scholars simply argue for tweaks to the existing allocation of authority. See 
Adler, supra note 6, at 143–45 (explaining that the existence of national public 
goods may, but does not necessarily, justify federal regulation); Revesz, supra, 
at 2410 (suggesting interstate spillovers be reduced through a federal scheme 
of marketable permits in environmental degradation). 
 41. See Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 1313–16; Chemerinsky, Empower-
ing States, supra note 15, at 1013–18. 
 42. See Schapiro, supra note 8, at 1411–17; Schapiro, Interactive Federal-
ism, supra note 15, at 250–62. 
 43. Schapiro, Interactive Federalism, supra note 15, at 285–317. 
 44. See Jones, supra note 8, at 108–10.  
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even “vertical regulatory competition.”45 This movement began 
as a response to a dualist model of federalism premised on pre-
serving state sovereignty by delimiting spheres of state author-
ity immune from federal interference. Finding the task as diffi-
cult as it is fruitless, early scholars have advocated strong, 
overlapping state and federal jurisdiction. Some scholars have 
gone so far as to argue that all regulatory matters should be 
presumptively within the authority of both the federal and 
state governments.46  
Dynamic federalism scholars acknowledge the problems 
inherent in their multijurisdictional approach to federalism’s 
many conflicts. As one scholar notes, concurrent jurisdiction 
has significant costs in the form of uniformity, finality, and hi-
erarchical accountability.47 Indeed, the Supremacy Clause 
builds hierarchy into the very fabric of our constitutional 
framework of government and accountability has emerged as 
an important determinant of the Supreme Court’s federalism 
jurisprudence.48 In response, scholars of dynamic federalism 
argue that the alternative values it promotes, such as plurality, 
dialogue, and redundancy, are worth the sacrifice and that the 
dualist approach fairs no better in meeting these legislative 
norms.49 
Scholars arguing for a dynamic conception of federalism 
typically do not focus on specific fields of law,50 and no central 
framework currently exists to link the various theories and ap-
proaches together. A few scholars, however, have used a dy-
namic model of federalism as a framework for examining and 
reassessing current modes of environmental regulation. We re-
view three examples of this approach to illustrate how dynamic 
theories are being applied to environmental federalism. 
 
 45. Id. at 122. 
 46. Schapiro, Interactive Federalism, supra note 15, at 295 (“In the poly-
phonic conception, courts should apply a background presumption that state 
power and federal power can coexist.”). 
 47. Id. at 290–92. 
 48. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 576 (1995); New York v. 
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992); Schapiro, Interactive Federalism, su-
pra note 15, at 291. 
 49. Schapiro, Interactive Federalism, supra note 15, at 292–93 (arguing 
that preserving clear channels of political accountability between the states 
and the federal government is all but impossible in a complex commercial so-
ciety like the United States). 
 50. See, e.g., id. at 248–49 (describing a dynamic model of federalism that 
is independent of the substantive legal issues). 
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William Buzbee has long argued that a dynamic interplay 
exists between state and federal regulatory efforts, and that 
these interactions have been crucial to innovations in environ-
mental regulation throughout the country.51 Buzbee highlights 
one particularly important dynamic: the opportunities for state 
government officials to make their names by promoting and 
implementing aggressive environmental regulatory initiatives 
when the federal government fails to act.52 He provides an ele-
gant illustration using so-called brownfield sites—
contaminated industrial sites abandoned in urban areas.53 
Through this example, Buzbee exposes the shifts between fed-
eral and state innovations and the important synergies that 
emerge from this dynamic back-and-forth. Buzbee touts the vir-
tues of overlapping jurisdiction in facilitating knowledge trans-
fer and learning, counteracting pressures to succumb to a race 
to the bottom, and enhancing citizen enforcement through mul-
tiple fora.54  
Complementing Buzbee’s work, Kirsten Engel and Scott 
Saleska have emphasized the power of regulation at one level of 
government to prompt regulation at another.55 The benefit of 
 
 51. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Brownfields, Environmental Federalism, 
and Institutional Determinism, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 44–
46 (1997). 
 52. William W. Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L.J. 108, 114, 115–16 (2005) (“[W]hen federal environmental action 
appears to be ‘underkill’ of what written laws and regulations have historically 
allowed or required, it creates opportunities for environmentally oriented citi-
zen and state actors (such as state attorneys general) to supplement federal 
enforcement or challenge the legal adequacy of the newly relaxed regulatory 
environment.”). 
 53. Buzbee, supra note 51, at 1–2. 
 54. Buzbee, supra note 52, at 125–26. Buzbee has also pointed out the ac-
countability risk that comes with regulatory overlap: namely, the potential 
that it will appear that no one is in charge and hence regulatory inaction will 
result. See William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A 
Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1, 30–33 (2003) [hereinafter Buz-
bee, Regulatory Commons]. He nevertheless argues that regulatory overlap 
contains an “antidote” to this very problem by ensuring that those most inter-
ested in addressing a given environmental problem can assess what might be 
the appropriate level of government to address it. These interested parties 
hope that, in the long term, the association that will develop between a partic-
ular problem and a regulatory jurisdiction will erase the “ownership” problem 
that results from too many potential regulators. Buzbee, supra note 52, at 126. 
For another analysis of the benefits of overlapping jurisdiction in the envi-
ronmental field, see Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Fe-
deralism in Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159, 160–63 (2006). 
 55. Kirsten H. Engel & Scott R. Saleska, Subglobal Regulation of the 
Global Commons: The Case of Climate Change, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 183, 189 
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this “domino effect,” they argue, is that regulation stalled at 
one level of government may be ripe for action at a different 
level of government where the political environmental is more 
favorable.56 Movement to regulate in one state, for example, 
can establish a precedent that prompts regulation horizontally 
in other states or vertically at the federal level.57 Moreover, be-
cause this dynamic is often useful in drawing attention to is-
sues of national importance and thereby putting them on the 
federal agenda, Engel argued in a subsequent article that fed-
eral preemption should be narrowly construed so as not to cut 
off this important dynamic among the states and between state 
and federal regulation.58 
Other scholars have advocated a more radical departure 
from the classical model. They focus on institutional impedi-
ments to effective environmental regulation, at both the state 
and federal levels.59 According to this view, current institution-
al models delimited by traditional jurisdictional boundaries are 
ineffective.60 Jody Freeman and Daniel Farber, in particular, 
 
(2005). 
 56. Empirical evidence exists supporting this hypothesis from both the 
Reagan era and the current Bush administration, where political scientists 
have observed a marked shift to progressive policymaking at the state level. 
See, e.g., TESKE, supra note 1, at 16–17 (noting the push by “regulatory activ-
ists” to enact reforms at the state level relating to nutrition, the environment, 
and ATM charges when the federal government’s enthusiasm for such reforms 
waned in the 1980s and again in the 2000s). 
 57. Engel & Saleska, supra note 55, at 253; see also Engel, supra note 54, 
at 162–63 (arguing that giving states the freedom to develop environmental 
policy will create a “regulatory dialogue” between state and federal govern-
ment and improve environmental regulation). 
 58. Engel, supra note 54, at 161; see also Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against 
Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative Process, 82 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 20 (2007) (“State laws . . . are an important influence on 
Congress’s agenda.”). 
 59. See Jody Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, Modular Environmental Regu-
lation, 54 DUKE L.J. 795, 809 (2005) (asserting that institutional limits on ju-
risdiction lead to challenges, at both the state and federal level, to government 
efforts to formulate environmental policy); see also J.B. RUHL ET AL., THE LAW 
AND POLICY OF ECOSYSTEM SERVICES 284–88 (2007) (advocating an “institu-
tional structure” for ecosystem management that integrates authority at the 
state, regional, and local level); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Collaborative Ecosys-
tem Governance: Scale, Complexity, and Dynamism, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 189, 
193 (2002) (advocating the acceptance of a “collaborative ecosystem gover-
nance” model that “recognizes the need for integrated, holistic management of 
ecosystems as systems, and grapples with questions of scale and complexity in 
ecosystem management, emphasizing locally or regionally tailored solutions 
within broader structures of coordination and public accountability”). 
 60. Freeman & Farber, supra note 59, at 797–98. 
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contend that efficient, more responsive environmental regula-
tion depends on overcoming cross-agency coordination problems 
at all levels of government.61 They argue that the complexity 
and uniqueness of many environmental problems demands 
flexible institutional frameworks that can be tailored to a spe-
cific problem.62 The authors use the CalFed program, a joint 
federal, state, and local government effort to manage the San 
Francisco Bay-Delta, as an example of their modular theory. 
Their approach is distinctive in its use of a negotiated process 
for setting regulatory and management goals, which then form 
the basis for fashioning a unique multijurisdictional institu-
tional apparatus tailored to the specific problem.63 
As the preceding discussion shows, scholars of dynamic fe-
deralism have identified many examples of beneficial overlap 
between state and federal environmental regulation, as well as 
the many advantages of maintaining dynamic, overlapping ju-
risdiction between the states and federal government. Several 
are also experimenting with more ambitious models for restruc-
turing regulatory institutions to enhance the benefits of over-
lapping state-federal jurisdiction.  
C. CRITIQUES OF THE COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM FRAMEWORK 
Cooperative federalism, the dominant model for federal en-
vironmental statutes, differs in important respects from both 
the classical matching principle and a dynamic model of feder-
alism. The policy recommendations we make must thus consid-
er the implications for cooperative federalism.64 
In its simplest form, cooperative federalism is a system of 
shared authority between the federal and state governments.65 
Typically, Congress delegates broad regulatory authority to a 
federal agency (such as standards setting, enforcement, and 
permitting) and authorizes the agency to delegate program im-
 
 61. Id. at 798–99. 
 62. Id.  
 63. Id. at 836–37; see also id. at 799 (“[T]he goal of modularity is to let the 
solutions to environmental problems determine institutional arrangements as 
much as possible.”). 
 64. See Denise Scheberle, The Evolving Matrix of Environmental Federal-
ism and Intergovernmental Relationships, PUBLIUS, Winter 2005, at 69, 72 
(noting that, under a cooperative federalism framework, “[b]y 2000, states ran 
about three-fourths of all environmental programs, up from 41 percent in 
1993”). 
 65. RUHL ET AL., supra note 59, at 282–83. 
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plementation to states that satisfy certain requirements.66 An 
important requirement is that state programs adopt environ-
mental standards at least as stringent as the federal program. 
Further, to ensure adequate state implementation, the federal 
government retains oversight authority.67 This residual author-
ity enables the federal government to bring enforcement ac-
tions within a delegated state and to unilaterally withdraw a 
state’s delegated powers for failing to meet federal standards.68  
Cooperative federalism is at odds with both the classical 
and dynamic schools of federalism, although the incongruity is 
most pronounced with the former. Among advocates of the 
matching principle, cooperative federalism unjustifiably ex-
pands the role of the federal government by sanctioning federal 
intervention irrespective of whether an environmental problem 
is wholly intrastate.69 This makes cooperative federalism “both 
a blessing and a curse.”70 Although states can largely control 
the regulatory programs delegated to them, most of the costs of 
the programs are fixed by immutable federal standards.71 The 
devolutionist wing of the classical school is particularly in-
censed by the “federalizing” of local issues, and has singled out 
national safe drinking water standards as an especially egre-
gious example of federal overreaching.72 At the same time, en-
vironmental problems of truly national scope that warrant fed-
eral regulation are hobbled by the inadequacies of state 
implementation.73  
A cooperative framework fares somewhat better with the 
dynamic school. The overlapping authority, although asymme-
 
 66. Scheberle, supra note 64, at 71 (describing cooperative federalism as a 
“partial-preemption approach” under which “the EPA or other federal agency 
would delegate day-to-day programmatic responsibilities back to the states 
with approved programs”). 
 67. Id. 
 68. RUHL ET AL., supra note 59, at 283. 
 69. Joseph Zimmerman, National-State Relations: Cooperative Federalism 
in the Twentieth Century, PUBLIUS, Spring 2001, at 15, 24–25 (arguing that 
the partial preemption aspect of cooperative federalism “increase[es] its com-
plexity and rais[es] accountability issues”); see RUHL ET AL., supra note 59, at 
283 (noting that the complexity created by cooperative federalism can lead to 
“uncoordinated and ineffective” distributions of power). 
 70. RUHL ET AL., supra note 59, at 283; see also Michael S. Greve, Against 
Cooperative Federalism, 70 MISS. L.J. 557, 559 (2000) (calling cooperative fe-
deralism a “rotten idea”). 
 71. Scheberle, supra note 64, at 71–73. 
 72. Id. at 72–73.  
 73. Stewart, supra note 24, at 1215–16. 
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tric, at least has the trappings of a dynamic system. Coopera-
tive federalism nonetheless falls short from the point of view of 
the dynamic school. The federal laws and regulations are often, 
but not always, so comprehensive as to exclude for all practical 
purposes alternative approaches by the states.74 Viewed from 
the perspective of either classical or dynamic theory, coopera-
tive federalism entails misconceived compromises that sacrifice 
either too much efficiency or too much diversity and innovation. 
II.  AN ADAPTIVE MODEL FOR ENVIRONMENTAL 
FEDERALISM   
We use the term “adaptive system” descriptively and nor-
matively in this Article. It is used descriptively as a model of 
environmental systems, particularly ecosystems, and it is used 
normatively as a framework for understanding environmental 
federalism.75 We argue further that it provides compelling sup-
port for a dynamic conception of federalism. 
This Part will argue that the strength of adaptive systems 
derives from their capacity to maintain optimizing and diversi-
fying processes, which are inherently in opposition to each oth-
er. We will show that both are essential to effective policymak-
ing because environmental problems are complex and time-
variant. Drawing on evolutionary models of democracy, we ar-
gue that environmental federalism must have institutional me-
chanisms to sustain policy innovation and resist forces, particu-
larly powerful interest groups, that undermine its 
adaptability.76 The Part begins by describing adaptive systems 
 
 74. See, e.g., Robert L. Glicksman, From Cooperative to Inoperative Fede-
ralism: The Perverse Mutation of Environmental Law and Policy, 41 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 719, 800–03 (2006) (arguing that cooperative federalism binds 
the hands of both the federal government and the states). Nevertheless, some 
scholars sympathetic to the dynamic framework cite cooperative federalism 
approvingly. See, e.g., Buzbee, supra note 52, at 122–26 (discussing the advan-
tages of “regulatory overlap”). 
 75. Other scholars have drawn on theories about complex adaptive sys-
tems. See generally J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to 
Describe the Evolution of Law and Society and Its Practical Meaning for De-
mocracy, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1406, 1409–11 (1996) (attempting to explain how 
and why law “evolves”). As we will argue, however, the lessons we draw from 
adaptive systems and the policy recommendations we make differ substantial-
ly from this prior work.  
 76. Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Is Democracy Like Sex?, 48 VAND. L. REV. 
1635, 1646 (1995) (“Just as the randomizing factor of sex creates a ‘moving 
target’ for parasites, preventing them from becoming too well adapted to their 
hosts, so the randomizing factor of democratic politics creates a ‘moving target’ 
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and then turns to examining how their basic features are al-
ready reflected in environmental federalism and how these fea-
tures can be enhanced to strengthen U.S. environmental law.  
A. THE MERITS OF AN ADAPTIVE MODEL OVER THE MATCHING 
PRINCIPLE 
Environmental policymaking must contend with complex 
and unpredictable problems. To anyone remotely familiar with 
environmental law and policy, this is stating the obvious. It is 
nevertheless an important starting point, as the discussion that 
follows is premised on it. An adaptive model, which is designed 
to manage unpredictable change, is better suited to the com-
plexities of environmental policymaking than the matching 
principle, which assumes many of them away. 
Given the complexity and variability of environmental 
problems, the number of potential regulatory options inevitably 
will be overwhelming, and only limited grounds will exist for 
discriminating between them. Our rejection of the matching 
principle in favor of an adaptive model thus turns on two va-
riants of this basic problem: (1) the difficulty of identifying the 
efficient (i.e., optimal) regulatory approach, and (2) the unde-
fined scale of most environmental problems. We discuss both in 
turn as they apply to the matching principle and then examine 
how the structure of an adaptive model mitigates them and 
manages unpredictable change. 
1. The Practical Limits of the Matching Principle 
One need only consider a sampling of environmental prob-
lems to appreciate their intricacies. Prairie potholes, depres-
sional wetlands found in the Upper Midwest, function as criti-
cal watering holes for migratory birds and protect against local 
flooding.77 Thus, although geographically localized, their biolog-
ical importance is national if not international in scope.78 Simi-
larly, mercury emissions from coal-fired power plants have lo-
cal and global impacts. Mercury is emitted in two reactive 
 
for special interests, keeping their relationships with lawmakers from being 
too comfortable or mutually beneficial.”).  
 77. See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Wetlands, http://www.epa 
.gov/owow/wetlands/types/pothole.html (last visited Apr. 28, 2008). 
 78. See id. (describing the Upper Midwest as “one of the most important 
wetland regions in the world” and “home to more than 50 percent of North 
American migratory waterfowl, with many species dependent on the potholes 
for breeding and feeding”). 
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states.79 One is of only local significance because it quickly pre-
cipitates from the atmosphere.80 The other persists in the at-
mosphere and is a major contributor to rising mercury levels in 
ocean mammals globally.81 In both of these examples, the prob-
lem does not exist on a single geographical or even temporal 
scale, but on multiple scales simultaneously.82 
These technical challenges have both natural and human 
dimensions. The complexity of natural systems is by now well 
known, and the examples of misdirected federal and state pro-
grams abound. For instance, government officials for many 
years believed that a strict regime of fire suppression would 
protect forests.83 It took decades for foresters to appreciate the 
important role that fire plays in maintaining the biological di-
versity and resilience of forest ecosystems and for them to alter 
their policies.84 Analogous stories could be told about the envi-
ronmental effects of intensive agriculture, the dynamics of 
groundwater and surface water management, and the many 
challenges of assessing the risks of industrial pollutants.85 In 
all of these cases, the phenomena are complex, the data are 
scarce, and understanding is thin. 
Many human actions are adding to this complexity. Rural 
land use patterns have proved particularly challenging in this 
respect, as evidenced by growing forest management problems 
associated with increasing numbers of homes located on the 
boundaries of state and national forests.86 Protection of wet-
 
 79. See Lisa Heinzerling & Rena I. Steinzor, A Perfect Storm: Mercury and 
the Bush Administration, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,297, 10,303–05 (2004) (discuss-
ing mercury contamination and noting that it is both a local and a global prob-
lem). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. See Stephen R. Carpenter et al., Millennium Ecosystem Assessment: 
Research Needs, 314 SCIENCE 257, 257 (2006) (“Local processes sometimes 
spread to become important regionally or globally, but ecosystem services at 
more aggregated scales are seldom simple summations of the services at finer 
scales. . . . We need robust, manageable frameworks for analyzing ecosystem 
services at multiple scales.”); Holling, supra note 13, at 7 (“Adaptive cycles in 
ecosystems occur in scales ranging from . . . centimeters and days to hundreds 
of kilometers and millennia.”). 
 83. George Busenberg, Wildfire Management in the United States: The 
Evolution of a Policy Failure, 21 REV. POL’Y RES. 145, 146 (2004). 
 84. Id. at 147–48. 
 85. ROBERT PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, 
SCIENCE, & POLICY 230–33 (5th ed. 2005) (noting the challenges of risk as-
sessment and the frequency with which regulators get it wrong).  
 86. Jesse McKinley & Kirk Johnson, On Fringe of Forests, Homes and 
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lands has lost out to similar conflicts between development 
pressures and environmental preservation.87 At the same time, 
commercial globalization expands international connections, 
adding another layer of interactions.88 The dramatic rise in in-
vasive species, transport of hazardous wastes internationally, 
and the growing national and international markets for drink-
ing water are exemplary of these changes.89 
The complexity of environmental problems does not lend 
itself to standard optimization methods. Whereas an idealized 
optimization problem is akin to locating the peak of a single 
isolated mountain, say Kilimanjaro, environmental policies are 
set in a domain analogous to the Himalayas, where the number 
of peaks (potential optima) is so large that it would be impossi-
ble to explore all of them to identify the highest peak among 
them. The complexity of ecosystem management exemplifies 
this point, but many other environmental problems ranging 
from pollution control to land use to waste management raise 
issues of similar difficulty.90 It is therefore implausible that a 
single government entity, including the federal government, 
could identify the efficient regulatory solution. Although the 
probability of success improves with multiple, independent 
state regulators, success is far from guaranteed even then. 
Our second objection challenges the assumption implicit in 
the matching principle that eliminating all, or even most, ex-
ternalities is possible. One of the basic features of ecosystems, 
for example, is that they operate on multiple spatial, organiza-
tional, and temporal scales.91 A single forest ecosystem will 
 
Wildfires Meet, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2007, at A1.  
 87. TIFFANY WRIGHT ET AL., CTR. FOR WATERSHED PROT., DIRECT AND IN-
DIRECT IMPACTS OF URBANIZATION ON WETLAND QUALITY, at i–ii (2006), 
http://www.cwp.org/wetlands/articles/WetlandsArticle1.pdf. 
 88. Holling, supra note 13, at 15 (arguing that globalization and dramatic 
wealth accumulation “could trigger a rare and major pulse of social transfor-
mation”); Jianguo Liu et al., Complexity of Coupled Human and Natural Sys-
tems, 317 SCIENCE 1513, 1516 (2007) (“As globalization intensifies, there are 
more interactions among even geographically distant systems and across 
scales.” (citations omitted)). 
 89. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 85, at 34–38. 
 90. Karkkainen, supra note 59, at 200. Forest ecosystems, for example, 
are designed to adapt to unpredictable change and thus incorporate structural 
features that belie strategies premised solely on optimization. See also Levin, 
supra note 12, at 11 (“[T]he number of local optima in real situations may be 
enormous. . . . [E]volution is a historically constrained process, shaped in large 
parts by frozen accidents of times past.”). 
 91. See RUHL ET AL., supra note 59, at 20–22 (discussing the difficulties of 
identifying well-delineated boundaries of ecosystems); see also Carpenter et 
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contain tiny microbial species with brief lives and small territo-
ries, large mammals with moderate life spans and large territo-
ries, and trees with very long lives and modest, but sizable ter-
ritories. Moreover, specific environments or species may have 
impacts that extend beyond state or national jurisdictions. As 
mentioned above, prairie potholes appear to be purely local, but 
their importance transcends local, state, and national bounda-
ries because of their importance to migratory birds.92  
The matching principle fails because no systematic way ex-
ists to bound most environmental problems, and thus to ensure 
that all of the costs and benefits are internalized by the regu-
lating entity.93 Static economic models work because their pre-
dictions can be updated and refined according to a predeter-
mined scale of the problem. Economists, for example, make 
useful predictions about U.S. market trends in part because 
they understand the different scales of the system. This know-
ledge bounds their use of the models—they would never put 
much faith in predictions about an individual stock over the 
next six months or about the U.S. market in ten years. In both 
cases, the time variance of the system nullifies the reliability of 
the model over the time scales of these predictions. Although 
such limits do not invalidate economic models—no model is ac-
curate under all conditions—they do significantly circumscribe 
when and how they can be used. 
2. The Power of an Adaptive Model to Contend with 
Unpredictable Change  
Adaptive systems operate through a mix of optimizing and 
diversifying processes; optimization is not the overriding objec-
 
al., supra note 82, at 257 (identifying difficulties in monitoring changes in eco-
systems due to differences in scale); Holling, supra note 13, at 3, 7 (noting the 
ranges of ecosystem adaptation). 
 92. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, supra note 77. This position 
should not be read as the stale platitude that everything is linked together in 
nature. That view is an overstatement, if not a mischaracterization, of how 
natural systems are interconnected. Our point is that individual components 
of natural systems are linked across a very broad range of scales, although, as 
one would expect, the larger the spatial scale, the fewer and weaker the con-
nections.  
 93. See Esty, supra note 6, at 587 (noting “structural mismatches” related 
to inexact jurisdictional boundaries); Holling, supra note 13, at 15–17 (making 
the point that under the current conditions of significant social unrest and en-
vironmental disruption, “[t]he scale of the issues is such that they are beyond 
the reach of any one” institution or jurisdictional authority). 
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tive.94 An adaptive model of environmental federalism would 
embrace existing processes for refining environmental policy, 
but reject the presumption that the optimal solution can be 
identified.95 The model also recognizes that while efficiency is 
clearly important, it also has its downside—to the extent that a 
system is optimized to a specific set of conditions, it may be less 
resilient to change.96 The challenge for environmental federal-
ism is to maintain processes of optimization that promote policy 
refinement and efficiency, while cultivating a diversity of poli-
cies at different levels of government. 
An adaptive model has two central elements that set it 
apart from the static model underlying the matching principle. 
First, it is premised on optimization being relative and not ab-
solute.97 As a result, it incorporates mechanisms, or takes ad-
vantage of external forces, that mitigate the tendency for sys-
tems to become stalled in local optima or dead ends.98 This 
propensity is a frequent criticism of government bureaucracies, 
and is evident in nature too—species retain many traits despite 
the potential for superior alternatives to evolve.99 The antidotes 
in evolutionary biology are disruptive events and processes that 
generate random genetic variation.100 Through such exogenous 
 
 94. Stuart Kauffman & Simon Levin, Toward a General Theory of Adap-
tive Walks on Rugged Landscapes, 128 J. THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 11, 12–13 
(1987) (observing that the adaptive landscape is a very rugged one, implying 
that so many peaks exist that global maximization is impossible, and as a re-
sult, noting that these systems are path-dependent and historically contin-
gent).  
 95. Donald T. Hornstein, Complexity Theory, Adaptation, and Administra-
tive Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 913, 942 (2005) (discussing the balance that must be 
struck between “exploration and exploitation” in the context of perpetually re-
fining existing processes). 
 96. SIMON A. LEVIN, FRAGILE DOMINION: COMPLEXITY AND THE COMMONS 
173 (1999) (“[R]esilience and resistance to change are two sides of the same 
coin. What is desirable in some systems (resilience) is the opponent of moder-
nization in others . . . .”); Holling, supra note 13, at 14 (“[T]he longer the sys-
tem is ‘locked in,’ the greater the vulnerability and the bigger and more dra-
matic its collapse will be.”).  
 97. Kauffman & Levin, supra note 94, at 24–26. 
 98. Id. 
 99. See Sewall Wright, Evolution in Mendelian Populations, 16 GENETICS 
97, 97–100 (1931) (explaining that many factors influence evolution, and con-
sequently, evolution of new characteristics does not always follow from availa-
bility of higher-level traits). 
 100. Id. at 97–100, 102–04 (observing that maintenance of diversity pre-
serves inferior types against selective extinction and, in doing so, safeguards 
the potential for genetic combinations that allow evolutionary jumps). In eco-
systems, for example, genetic diversity within a species and maintenance of a 
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and endogenous processes, adaptive systems sacrifice relative 
efficiency for unrealized potential.101  
Second, adaptive systems protect diversity against the 
winnowing effects of optimizing processes through a frag-
mented structure and disruptive events. Ecosystems once again 
provide a simple explanatory case. Fragmentation, both geo-
graphical and temporal (hibernation is a variant of the latter), 
creates a diverse range of environments in which competition 
for resources occurs.102 As a consequence, selective pressures 
vary within an ecosystem and, because of this variation, the 
most competitive and successful species will vary too.103 Loosely 
speaking, diversity will track with the degree of fragmentation 
and differences in localized conditions.104 The resulting func-
tional redundancy buffers adaptive systems from the inevitable 
losses of individual components.105 
These two elements work in tandem. Ecosystems, for ex-
ample, are subject to disturbances from fires, droughts, and 
storms that disrupt the existing competitive environment(s), 
often transforming an affected area into a system dominated by 
opportunistic species well-adapted to harsher, high-risk condi-
tions.106 By contrast, if natural selection dictated ecosystem 
dynamics entirely, it would cause a steady loss of species diver-
sity and ultimate domination by the most competitive species—
the strong would inexorably win out.107 Yet, by creating a  
patchwork of local states, disruptive events create niches for 
 
diverse range of species provide a storehouse of genetic traits and species, 
some of which may be well adapted to unforeseeable changes in environmental 
conditions. See Kauffman & Levin, supra note 94, at 15 (pointing out that 
complex problems have an infinite set of potential answers). 
 101. LEVIN, supra note 96, at 18, 68–69 (observing that evolution works 
through “the continual generation and exploration of randomly generated in-
novations, and the reinforcement of some at the expense of others,” but noting 
that the process is imperfect in part because of its nonlinearities). 
 102. JOHN H. HOLLAND, HIDDEN ORDER: HOW ADAPTATION BUILDS COM-
PLEXITY 29 (1995). 
 103. Id. at 27–31 (describing how the process of local disturbances and va-
riability maintains diversity and ensures resilience). 
 104. Id. at 27. 
 105. Id. at 28–29. 
 106. LEVIN, supra note 96, at 88 (“The small local disturbances not only 
maintain the character of the system by maintaining the species that are early 
colonists but poor competitors; they also maintain the resiliency of the system, 
preserving the opportunistic species that thrive under the conditions accom-
panying the unpredictable but inevitable environmental changes that occur at 
broader spatial scales, such as massive windthrows or fire.”). 
 107. Id. at 159.  
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organisms that can survive under a variety of conditions, rang-
ing from harsh environments with few competitors to attractive 
ones subject to intense competition.108 Opportunistic species, in 
particular, play a unique role in allowing ecosystems to adapt 
to large-scale events or changes.109 
An adaptive model can be viewed as a variant of a ba-
lanced-portfolio strategy, but with some important twists. In 
both cases, short-term growth potential—that is, pure optimi-
zation—is sacrificed for the more stable dynamics and dimi-
nished risk of catastrophic loss that diversification provides.110 
However, adaptive models do not fetishize stability, which 
alone would threaten adaptability.111 The unique power of 
adaptive models is that their fragmented, multilevel structure 
allows diversifying and optimizing processes to coexist.112 
Equally importantly, rather than treating unpredictability as 
an unavoidable evil, adaptive models harness it to maintain di-
versity and, paradoxically, to support resiliency.113 Thus, whe-
reas the matching principle rests on the slim hope that efficien-
cy alone is critical and that it can be reliably resolved, an 
adaptive model accepts, and even tries to exploit, unpredictabil-
ity while preserving the benefits of small-scale efficiencies and 
diversification. 
B. AN ADAPTIVE FRAMEWORK FOR ENVIRONMENTAL 
FEDERALISM 
Adaptive systems provide an alternative framework for ex-
amining environmental federalism. Similar to traditional theo-
ries of federalism,114 this framework views the multilevel juris-
dictional structure of the federal system as critical to 
sustaining a diversity of environmental laws and policies. Ju-
risdictional fragmentation functions as the analogue of ecologi-
cal niches in a forest, sustaining loosely self-contained areas of 
 
 108. Id. at 162–67. 
 109. Id. at 165–67 (describing the important role “keystones” play in an 
ecosystem). 
 110. Id. at 159. 
 111. Id. at 156 (“[E]cosystem structure and dynamics emerge from selection 
operating at lower levels, and[ ] feedbacks from higher levels are weak because 
of the individualistic distribution of species.”). 
 112. Id. at 159.  
 113. Simon A. Levin & R.T. Paine, Disturbance, Patch Formation, and 
Community Structure, 71 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 2744, 2744 (1974). 
 114. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 24, at 1210–11 (noting the importance of 
decentralized decision making to environmental policy). 
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policy development that are dominated by localized competition 
and selection pressures (for example, socioeconomic, political, 
and environmental).115 Just as selection pressures—both natu-
ral and human—allow diversity to survive, the myriad horizon-
tal and vertical interconnections between jurisdictions allow 
innovations to spread.116 
1. Competition and Diversity in Environmental Policymaking 
Battles over environmental policy occur at every level of 
government. This competition to exploit limited legislative and 
administrative resources is environmental policy’s analogue of 
natural selection.117 Two primary groups populate the competi-
tive landscape of environmental policy: environmentalists and 
regulated business interests.118 We use public-choice theory as 
a model of their competitive interactions.119 Consistent with the 
general consensus among federalism scholars, we assume that 
concentrated business interests are better positioned to organ-
ize and lobby for or against legislation than diffuse, heteroge-
neous public-oriented environmentalists.120 Restated in biologi-
cal terms, we treat business interests as the fittest lobbying 
group.121  
The scholarly debate over environmental federalism has 
focused on the structural differences between the state- and 
federal-level legislative processes that facilitate or impede pas-
sage of environmental regulations. Scholars have considered 
whether the importance of party affiliation rather than issues 
in state elections impedes lobbying for environmental regula-
tions, whether the larger and more heterogeneous range of in-
terests at the federal level exacerbates public-choice problems, 
and whether the parochial economic concerns of state officials 
and legislators create a distinctive bias against environmental 
 
 115. Id. at 1211. 
 116. Id. at 1210. 
 117. Id. at 1211. 
 118. Id. at 1213. 
 119. Revesz, supra note 33, at 559–63 (describing the central claim about 
public-choice theory as it applies to environmental federalism). 
 120. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 24, at 1213. 
 121. See Reynolds, supra note 76, at 1642–43 (observing that the resilience 
of a political system derives in no small part from its ability to resist political 
parasites, such as special interest groups sucking resources off of the govern-
ment in an unproductive manner). Even academics who challenge traditional 
public-choice theory acknowledge that “[i]nterest groups matter in shaping 
regulatory policy, and it is difficult to imagine an environment in which they 
would not have a strong degree of influence.” TESKE, supra note 1, at 196. 
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measures.122 As discussed in Part I, the objective of this debate 
has been to ascertain the appropriate balance of regulatory au-
thority between the states and federal government.  
Remarkably little attention has been paid to the impor-
tance of differences among the states. This is a striking over-
sight. While structural differences between the state and feder-
al levels of government remain highly debatable, the wide 
variability in conditions among the states that influence the 
success or failure of legislative efforts is not.123 From the pers-
pective of an adaptive framework, the state-federal debate 
ought to be a sideshow. What counts most is the diversity that 
is sustained by the variation in factors driving legislation with-
in the states.124 California’s environmental policies, for exam-
ple, are not a product of subtle public-choice dynamics, but 
primarily of local political, environmental, and socioeconomic 
factors that dictate whether legislative activity on environmen-
tal issues is successful.125 
Diversity in environmental policy is also preserved by loca-
lized and large-scale disturbances. Just as fires restart the suc-
cessional process in a forest,126 so too can socioeconomic, envi-
ronmental, or political shifts disrupt the dominance of 
concentrated interest groups in a political system.127 The rapid 
emergence of federal environmental laws during the 1970s is 
the most striking example of this dynamic.128 Dramatic envi-
ronmental events, political opportunism, and grassroots activ-
ism were among the key driving factors.129 More recently, the 
emergence of climate change represents a major environmental 
disturbance that threatens the dominance of the energy and 
transportation lobbies over environmental regulation in these 
 
 122. E.g., Buzbee, supra note 51, at 45–46. 
 123. See supra note 9. 
 124. See Hills, supra note 58, at 17 (“State and local politicians . . . are nat-
ural policy entrepreneurs who can significantly influence what sorts of condi-
tions are publicly recognized as problems.”). 
 125. See Potoski, supra note 9, at 339. 
 126. See LEVIN, supra note 96, at 88 (explaining how fires can maintain the 
character of an ecosystem). 
 127. Such disturbances clearly occur at different times and to different de-
grees between jurisdictions. 
 128. Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 59, 67 (1992); Robert Repetto, Introduction to PUNCTUATED 
EQUILIBRIUM AND THE DYNAMICS OF U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 1, 1–2 (Ro-
bert Repetto ed., 2006). 
 129. Elliott et al., supra note 11, at 316–17. 
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sectors.130 The inherent unpredictability of the political system 
is just one of many randomizing forces that can dethrone en-
trenched interest groups.131 
The virtues of an adaptive model go beyond sustaining di-
versity; they also enable regulators to address multifaceted en-
vironmental problems. Ecosystems, as we have discussed, op-
erate simultaneously at multiple scales.132 Regulation at 
multiple levels of government allows regulators to focus on is-
sues operating at different scales and to draw on different fields 
of expertise and experience.133  
A forest ecosystem, once again, offers a simple example to 
illustrate this point. We will assume that the forest is wholly 
contained within a single county jurisdiction. The forest pro-
vides numerous environmental services. At a global level, for 
example, the forest sequesters carbon and thus mitigates cli-
mate change, and it is a repository of biological diversity. At the 
local level, it is a source of wood products, a recreational space, 
and a buffer to commercial and residential development.134  
Each of these services may have local, state, regional, and 
national implications, depending on the circumstances, so the 
division of responsibilities cannot turn on the matching prin-
ciple. In addition, the depth of interest and ability to effectuate 
a policy response will not necessarily track presumptive juris-
dictional lines, and environmental regulation itself often has 
unexpected outcomes. These factors indicate that environmen-
tal regulation should be allowed to emerge fluidly based on the 
level of interest, resources, and expertise that the different gov-
ernment players bring to an issue. Federal involvement, for ex-
ample, may prove critical to addressing local aspects of some 
environmental problems, such as the transportation component 
of suburban sprawl. State and local governments, as we discuss 
below in the context of climate change policy, may have the po-
 
 130. See Micheline Maynard, Politics Forcing Detroit to Back New Fuel 
Rules, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2007, at A1. Climate change also has important 
local dimensions, as not all states are equally vulnerable to it and thus under 
equivalent pressures to adapt.  
 131. Reynolds, supra note 76, at 1646.  
 132. LEVIN, supra note 96, at 159. 
 133. Stewart, supra note 24, at 1210. 
 134. DOUGLAS J. KRIEGER, THE WILDERNESS SOCIETY, THE ECONOMIC 
VALUE OF FOREST ECOSYSTEM SERVICES: A REVIEW, at iii–iv (2001), available 
at http://www.wilderness.org/Library/Documents/upload/Economic-Value-of 
-Forest-Ecosystem-Services-A-Review.pdf. 
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litical will to address a global problem when it is lacking at the 
national level. 
2. The Distinctive Role of the Federal Government 
The authority of the federal government, particularly its 
supremacy power, introduces a critical asymmetry between 
federal and state governments,135 as well as a fundamental dif-
ference between the federal system and an adaptive model. 
Adaptive systems do not have anything equivalent to a hier-
archy of institutional powers. Different aggregate levels of an 
ecosystem, for example, may be connected, but their interac-
tions are not hierarchical in the sense that large-scale divisions 
can dictate the functions of smaller ones. Similarly, competition 
occurs between species, not at higher levels of organization, 
and fitness is solely a species’ attribute. 
Institutional hierarchy is unique to human systems, but it 
has been embraced only reluctantly. Traditional theories of fe-
deralism are premised on limiting the role of the federal gov-
ernment, and thus expect federal assertions of regulatory pow-
er to be justified.136 In modern environmental law, federal 
regulation is premised on several standard grounds, including 
the need for uniform regulations for interstate commerce, the 
economies of scale that come with federal-level regulation, and 
the distorting effects of externalities on state laws.137 Thus, un-
like natural adaptive systems, which emerge from the ground 
up, humans have the temerity to assert control from the top 
down.  
An important benefit of this structure is that the federal 
government can facilitate the spread of regulatory innova-
tions.138 The value of innovation is one of the oldest justifica-
 
 135. See Schapiro, Interactive Federalism, supra note 15, at 291 (describing 
the difficulties in determining which government entity to hold accountable 
when federal and state laws govern the same issue). 
 136. Id. at 257. 
 137. Robert L. Glicksman & Richard E. Levy, A Collective Action Perspec-
tive on Ceiling Preemption by Federal Environmental Regulation: The Case of 
Global Climate Change, 102 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 
13, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1007021); Stewart, supra note 24, at 
1211–16. 
 138. Gerber & Teske, supra note 9, at 870–71 (“[T]he federal government 
can ‘force’ states to adopt policy innovations by writing them into federal re-
quirements. This strong federal presence may also facilitate policy diffusion 
through federal coordination of policy innovations.”); Susan Welch & Kay 
Thompson, The Impact of Federal Incentives on State Policy Innovation, 24 
AM. J. POL. 715, 716–17 (1980) (finding that policies with federal incentives 
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tions for a federalist system, encouraging, as it does, the role of 
states as “laboratories of democracy.”139 However, even if most 
innovations originate at lower levels of government, the federal 
level is uniquely positioned to disseminate these innovations. 
The capacity of the federal government to do so far outstrips 
that of the states by virtue of its unique relationship with each 
state, as well as the status of the national government as the 
top regulator. While regulators in Maine may communicate on-
ly rarely with those in Oregon about water quality issues, they 
will interact regularly with federal regulators. This hub-and-
spokes network facilitates the transfer of innovations in Maine 
to Oregon, either on the strength of the federal EPA’s sugges-
tion or mandate, or simply through more effective knowledge 
transfer.140 
These points do not denigrate the traditional justifications 
for federal regulation that have animated debate over environ-
mental federalism. The benefits of regulatory uniformity, the 
race-to-the-bottom rationale, and the possible disparity in pub-
lic-choice dynamics between legislative processes at the state 
and federal levels are all important.141 The hierarchy inherent 
in the federal system thus clearly has its place. Yet, as the 
Founders understood from the outset, it poses many risks as 
well. From the standpoint of adaptive systems and traditional 
theories of federalism, the most obvious risk is the dramatic 
loss in diversity that can result from preemptive federal regula-
tion.142 This loss may be a direct result of a strict preemptive 
standard or may arise more subtly from the highly aggregated 
level at which federal regulators view environmental prob-
lems.143  
The potential dynamic implications of a dominant federal 
role also may be important. If policymaking gravitates to the 
federal level to the exclusion of the states, it risks triggering 
 
attached to them diffuse more rapidly than policies that emerge entirely from 
the state level). 
 139. Schapiro, Interactive Federalism, supra note 15, at 267. 
 140. See, e.g., Buzbee, supra note 51, at 41–42 (discussing the case of 
brownfields regulation under CERCLA in which regulatory innovation started 
at the state level but was subsequently adopted and spread through EPA regu-
latory changes); Engel, supra note 27, at 170–72 (describing the transfer of 
vehicle emissions standards from California through the EPA to the country 
as a whole). 
 141. See Buzbee, supra note 52, at 45–46. 
 142. Buzbee, supra note 1, at 1599–1600; Engel, supra note 54, at 184–86. 
 143. Engel, supra note 54, at 184–86. 
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powerful feedback effects.144 Such a shift would increase the at-
tractiveness of the federal government for lobbying efforts, in-
tensifying competition and further marginalizing less powerful 
interest groups.145 These effects would in turn encourage po-
werful interests to direct even more resources to lobbying at the 
federal level and to elevating more issues.146 Moreover, because 
business interests are by broad consensus substantially fitter 
at playing this game,147 they would be likely to benefit dispro-
portionately from such feedback effects. 
A parallel concern is that resting too much authority in the 
federal government would unduly increase the inertia of the 
regulatory system.148 One of the great strengths of natural se-
lection is that by operating at a small scale, the feedback be-
tween the benefits and costs of individual variation are rela-
tively strong and swift, in part because individual species are 
inherently more vulnerable than ecosystems collectively.149 
These tight feedback effects are essential to adaptive change, 
as buffering mechanisms, by their very nature, diminish sensi-
tivity to exogenous pressures.150 Accordingly, while increasing 
the scale at which a problem is addressed may promote certain 
efficiencies, it may also increase the inertia of legislative 
processes and undermine the responsiveness of the federal sys-
 
 144. See Per G. Fredriksson & Noel Gaston, Environmental Governance in 
Federal Systems: The Effects of Capital Competition and Lobby Groups, 38 
ECON. INQUIRY 501, 502 (2000) (discussing the impacts of lobbying in the Eu-
ropean Union and observing that “the move to centralized regulation stimu-
lated industry lobbying” and that “industry lobbying may be stronger at the 
federal level”); Hills, supra note 58, at 22–23 (commenting on a similar point 
about business interests’ incentives to seek preemption legislation). Hills goes 
on to argue that  
[t]he task of the courts ought to be to create a default rule that will 
force Congress to squarely confront the question, even when members 
of Congress might be anxious to evade such a confrontation. A default 
rule against preemption places the onus on the interest groups most 
capable of promoting this debate—the pro-preemption groups.  
Id. at 26.  
 145. See Buzbee, supra note 1, at 1609–10. 
 146. Id. at 1610 (“[I]f there is one regulator, then all sides will seek to per-
suade or capture that regulator.”); see also JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, 
AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 15–16 
(1997) (explaining the dynamics of interest-group politics). 
 147. Stewart, supra note 24, at 1213.  
 148. Id. at 1219 (describing the “diseconomies of scale” that arise when an 
issue is elevated to the federal level). 
 149. LEVIN, supra note 96, at 203. 
 150. Id. (“[T]ight reward and punishment loops are essential for any adap-
tive change.”). 
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tem to changing conditions. Setting aside the 1970s, this dy-
namic is reflected in the slow progress of environmental regula-
tion at the federal and international levels,151 which also de-
rives in significant part from the more abstract posture of 
environmental problems that comes with addressing them at a 
higher governmental level.  
A central challenge for environmental federalism therefore 
is to cabin federal regulatory power without nullifying its many 
benefits. An optimal point of balance does not exist. Instead, we 
argue that an adaptive model of federalism suggests several 
doctrinal and regulatory strategies that limit federal power by 
reducing the opportunities for powerful interest groups to suc-
ceed in enacting broadly preemptive federal legislation that 
subverts the federal system. Our goal is not first and foremost 
to limit federal power, although that is clearly a byproduct of 
our approach, but to establish several presumptions that pro-
tect against the unique power embodied in the federal govern-
ment from being coopted in a manner that will be difficult for 
the political process to correct. 
C. ADAPTIVE FEDERALISM AS A HYBRID OF CLASSICAL AND 
DYNAMIC FEDERALISM 
The adaptive model of federalism we advocate is a variant 
of dynamic federalism and, as such, rejects the pure optimizing 
principle of the classical school. It goes beyond current scholar-
ship on dynamic federalism, though, insofar as it provides a ro-
bust theoretical framework for dynamic federalism. Adaptive 
federalism differs further in its structural focus on managing 
complex, time-variant problems that are characteristic of envi-
ronmental policy. This Section analyzes these distinctions to 
clarify the unique virtues of adaptive federalism. 
Adaptive federalism, like its dynamic counterparts, rejects 
the exclusive focus of the matching principle on optimization.152 
It recognizes that static optimizing strategies, on their own, are 
a prescription for turgid policymaking that is prey to the com-
plexities of environmental problems.153 Rather than engaging 
in the charade of identifying the one putatively “efficient” level 
of government for environmental policymaking,154 an adaptive 
 
 151. Repetto, supra note 128, at 2. 
 152. Schapiro, Interactive Federalism, supra note 15, at 285. 
 153. Engel & Saleska, supra note 55, at 191–93; Karkkainen, supra note 
59, at 200–01. 
 154. Engel, supra note 54, at 161. 
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model is structurally designed to contend with unpredictable 
change. The basic philosophies of the two approaches could not 
be more different—one is premised on stable equilibrium condi-
tions and rigid control; the other seeks to exploit disruptive 
change as a source of resilience and adaptability.155 
The basic elements of an adaptive model—fragmented op-
eration on multiple scales—are clearly evident in the multilevel 
jurisdictional structure of the federal system.156 The overlap-
ping state-federal regulatory authority of dynamic federalism 
follows naturally from this arrangement. Similarly, the exis-
tence of multiple jurisdictions at a variety of geographic scales 
mirrors the fragmented structure of adaptive systems that is 
essential to maintaining diversity.157 Adaptive federalism si-
multaneously sustains competitive legislative and administra-
tive processes that promote policy refinement and processes 
that produce a diverse range of policy options. This pluralistic 
model supports the open-ended innovation and testing essential 
to managing unpredictable change, without ignoring the impor-
tance of regulatory efficiency. It is therefore a hybrid of the 
classical and dynamic schools because it incorporates the prin-
ciple of efficiency of the former, while balancing it against the 
need for diversity found in the latter.  
Adaptive federalism would support and enhance the dy-
namic, multijurisdictional elements of the current system of 
environmental federalism. As we have seen, this approach is 
incompatible with the single-level framework dictated by the 
classical matching principle.158 For putatively local issues, such 
as those related to drinking water standards or land use, an 
adaptive model would allow for a significant federal role. Con-
versely, for putatively national (or international) issues, such 
as biodiversity or climate change, it would encourage state and 
local policy innovation.159 
The multilevel approach of adaptive (and dynamic) federal-
ism is not costless. Uniformity, accountability, and finality are 
all sacrificed to some degree by allowing multiple jurisdictions 
to address environmental problems simultaneously.160 Howev-
 
 155. Engel & Saleska, supra note 55, at 191–92. 
 156. Engel, supra note 54, at 166. 
 157. HOLLAND, supra note 102, at 29. 
 158. Engel & Saleska, supra note 55, at 191–93. 
 159. Schapiro, Interactive Federalism, supra note 15, at 267. 
 160. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 576 (1995) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring) (“The theory that two governments accord more liberty than 
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er, in many, if not most, areas of environmental regulation, un-
iformity is as much a problem as it is a virtue. Consider wide-
spread calls from regulated industries for “flexible” standards, 
such as those found in market-based regulations, and the 
vehement opposition to command-and-control regimes.161 Final-
ity, which is often in opposition to adaptability, is also a double-
edged sword in constantly changing natural, technological, and 
commercial environments. 
Accountability is possibly the most troublesome of these 
factors.162 Yet, in practice, important factors mitigate public 
confusion. Legislative action is challenging at any level of gov-
ernment, and there are always more legislative opportunities 
than time permits. Typically, when legislators make the effort 
to pass a law—particularly when it is public spirited, as op-
posed to narrow and interest-group driven—legislators want 
credit, establishing or strengthening their reputations.163 This 
motive is clearly evident in the recent spate of climate change 
initiatives at the state and local government levels, and it is 
certainly true of environmental legislation at the federal lev-
el.164 Further, it is not as though the matching principle is a 
model of clarity for public accountability. Dan Esty’s multifa-
ceted, disaggregated approach, for instance, anticipates intri-
cate intergovernmental arrangements that, at least in the ab-
stract, raise precisely the same problems with accountability.165 
 
one requires for its realization two distinct and discernable lines of political 
accountability . . . .”); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992) 
(“[W]here the Federal Government compels States to regulate, the accounta-
bility of both state and federal officials is diminished.”); Erwin Chemerinsky, 
In Defense of Judicial Review: A Reply to Professor Kramer, 92 CAL. L. REV. 
1013, 1018–22 (2004) (discussing the importance of judicial finality); Oates & 
Portney, supra note 17, at 345 (discussing the importance of uniformity in 
promoting the free flow of goods).  
 161. Arrandale, supra note 9, at 25 (describing the many complaints of 
mayors and stakeholders about the rigidity of EPA regulations). 
 162. Some legal scholars have argued that lawyers need to place less 
weight on accountability as a necessary aspect of environmental regulatory 
systems, and to recognize that nontraditional legal theories and approaches 
will be essential to address complex environmental problems. Karkkainen, su-
pra note 59, at 225–26. 
 163. See, e.g., Buzbee, Regulatory Commons, supra note 54, at 32–33; El-
liott et al., supra note 11, at 327 (discussing the importance of the passage of 
federal environmental laws to political entrepreneurs and their jockeying to 
obtain credit for passage of the laws). 
 164. Scheberle, supra note 64, at 77 (commenting on the “scope, intensity, 
and very public nature” of state environmental lawsuits, particularly with re-
gard to climate change). 
 165. Esty, Governance, supra note 36, at 1554–55. 
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Adaptive federalism also differs in important respects from 
current conceptions of dynamic federalism set forth by Robert 
Schapiro, Erwin Chemerinsky, and others.166 Dynamic federal-
ism is premised on empowering states, that is, treating them as 
coequal with the federal government and then letting them de-
termine which policy prevails when the policy preferences of 
the two levels of government conflict.167 Thus, rather than 
avoiding conflict by preserving enclaves of exclusive state juris-
diction (the outdated dualism approach), dynamic federalism 
embraces it.168 States gain autonomy but must win battles over 
policy on the merits.169 By contrast, adaptive federalism em-
phasizes the critical role that a multijurisdictional framework 
of government plays in allowing policy diversification and op-
timization to coexist.  
Although cooperative federalism is itself a hybrid, it poses 
certain challenges for an adaptive model. Cooperative federal-
ism establishes a relatively fixed framework for the states and 
the federal government to address environmental problems 
through a system of shared authority.170 In doing so, it breaks 
regulatory regimes into two distinct categories: standard set-
ting, which is delegated to the federal government; and imple-
mentation and enforcement, which is delegated to state and lo-
cal governments.171 An adaptive model eschews such rigid 
designations and prizes independence of action, which strict 
federal standards can drastically limit. Federal command-and-
control regimes, in particular, can leave little room for state ex-
perimentation.172  
Adaptive federalism would allow multiple jurisdictions to 
address a problem independently without circumscribing their 
roles or strategies. This would by no means preclude interjuris-
dictional coordination. To the contrary, an adaptive model con-
templates innovative experimentation with regional initiatives 
and other midlevel regimes. The point is to allow this to occur 
more organically based on the specific attributes of the prob-
lem, as well as surrounding political currents and socioeconom-
 
 166. See supra text accompanying notes 41–45. 
 167. Schapiro, Interactive Federalism, supra note 15, at 285. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. RUHL ET AL., supra note 59, at 282–83. 
 171. Id. at 283. 
 172. See Arrandale, supra note 9, at 22 (providing a real-world example of 
how the EPA’s strict regulations resulted in states being unable to address lo-
cal problems with innovative solutions). 
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ic factors. The current system of cooperative federalism relies 
on forced coordination mediated through the federal govern-
ment over the structural innovation-oriented approach of an 
adaptive model.173 
III.  IMPLICATIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM   
A previous Section characterized the existence of federal 
authority as a double-edged sword.174 On the one hand, federal 
policies can respond to environmental and resource issues that 
are national or multiregional in scope.175 This might include 
global or national pollution problems, such as climate change 
and acid rain, as well as the preservation of local resources that 
provide national benefits, such as unique wetlands. Further, in 
addition to quickly disseminating information about innovative 
proposals, federal authority can speed the adoption of innova-
tive policies first developed by the states, establish rules of un-
iformity needed for further innovation (and commerce) to flour-
ish, and eliminate the problematic effects of interstate 
competition for industry.176 On the other hand, the attractive-
ness of the federal supremacy power—particularly in its nega-
tive, preemptive mode—threatens policy diversity at the state 
and local levels that is essential to the adaptability of a federal 
system.177  
This Part draws on our adaptive framework to ground sev-
eral policy recommendations for sustaining overlapping state 
and federal jurisdiction. We begin by describing and defending 
our policy proposals. This analysis leads us to consider two dis-
tinct contexts in which legislative action takes place: (1) periods 
of business as usual, where public-choice dynamics dominate, 
and (2) periods of dramatic change, where volatile political cur-
rents dominate. An adaptive model, which is premised on pe-
riods of disruptive change, proves useful in addressing the leg-
islative processes in both regimes. Finally, drawing on specific 
initiatives related to Superfund and climate change, we ex-
amine the implications of our recommendations and, more gen-
erally, of a dynamic system of overlapping state and federal ju-
risdiction for environmental policy. 
 
 173. RUHL ET AL., supra note 59, at 282–83. 
 174. See supra text accompanying notes 144–51. 
 175. See supra text accompanying note 140. 
 176. See supra text accompanying notes 138–40. 
 177. Engel, supra note 54, at 184–86. 
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A. PREVENTING FEDERAL DOMINANCE 
The central challenge for environmental federalism is li-
miting federal authority to a level that is not overly destructive 
of policy diversity and innovation. Others have struggled with 
this same goal, but have concluded that broad devolution of au-
thority to the states is the only viable option.178 Among them, 
J.B. Ruhl, who also draws on theories of adaptive systems, ar-
gues that the current federal system of environmental regula-
tion is far too top-heavy and that, as a consequence, it has be-
come rigid and lost much of its ability to adapt.179 Similar to 
Bradley Karkkainen and Jody Freeman and Daniel Farber, 
Ruhl decries the fragmentation and lack of coordination be-
tween regulating entities.180 Further, although they may differ 
on specifics, these scholars, in essence, call for a flexible ap-
proach to environmental regulation based on a “nested hier-
archy of interrelated federal, state, and local government au-
thorities.”181 
Our adaptive approach complements this work, but adopts 
a different perspective and emphasizes a distinct set of issues. 
We argue for a dynamic system of overlapping federal and state 
regulatory jurisdiction. This framework is consistent with the 
general principles of dynamic federalism. As others have noted, 
retention of both federal and state jurisdiction reinforces 
processes that contribute to better regulatory outcomes, partic-
ularly opportunities for positive feedback and incentives for a 
higher level of coordination between the state and federal levels 
of government.182 Similarly, the “safety net” provided by the po-
tential for multiple regulators preserves legislative options for 
protecting environmental goods that might be sacrificed by one 
or the other level of government.183 Concurrent regulation is 
 
 178. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 20–22. 
 179. Ruhl, supra note 75, at 1475, 1477. Professor Ruhl’s approach is pre-
mised on Stuart Kauffman’s criticality theory, which has important implica-
tions for the basic architecture of successful adaptive systems. According to 
Kauffman’s theory, adaptability entails “less hierarchical, flatter, and more 
decentralized power structures,” and it places a much higher premium on the 
importance (and regularity) of dramatic change. Id. at 1418–19. 
 180. RUHL ET AL., supra note 59, at 281; see Freeman & Farber, supra note 
59, at 798; Karkkainen, supra note 59, at 204. 
 181. RUHL ET AL., supra note 59, at 284; see Freeman & Farber, supra note 
59, at 798–800; Karkkainen, supra note 59, at 201. 
 182. Hills, supra note 58, at 2. 
 183. Failure to act at a particular level of government may be the product 
of information gaps, the demands of other priorities, or interest-group capture. 
Whatever the reason, we agree with Erwin Chemerinsky, who argues that “[a] 
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further justified because it mitigates the influence of powerful 
interest groups.184 The rationale behind this view is simple: 
maintaining a dominant position in multiple fora is much more 
difficult than in one forum, and interest-group dominance will 
be disrupted at different times and to different degrees by 
changing conditions in each state.185 
The single most important means of fostering adaptive fe-
deralism is restricting federal regulatory preemption. A single 
preemptive legislative act eliminates the diversity of expe-
riences and knowledge of an entire level of government.186 This 
is a matter of great significance given the dramatic rise in 
preemptive statutes that have emerged from Congress187 and 
the Supreme Court’s willingness to infer preemption even 
where it is far from explicit in a statute.188 
We focus our attention on a specific type of federal preemp-
tion—ceiling preemption—that feeds the policy preferences of 
the powerful business interest groups most likely to leverage 
their abundant political power to undercut diversity and inno-
vation in environmental policymaking.189 Our recommenda-
tions draw from and reflect the insights of the public-choice li-
terature. We propose three central presumptions for courts and 
policymakers that are designed to contain federal preemptive 
authority. 
 
key advantage of having multiple levels of government is the availability of 
alternative actors to solve important problems. If the federal government fails 
to act, state and local government action is still possible.” Erwin Chemerinsky, 
Federalism Not as Limits, but as Empowerment, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1219, 
1234 (1997). 
 184. Our approach is consistent with calls by other scholars that “[t]o mi-
nimize capture, an overarching set of reforms should attempt to bring more 
players into the regulatory process and provide the important institutions 
with more resources to develop the capacity for independent analysis and im-
plementation.” TESKE, supra note 1, at 201. 
 185. The rapid growth in lobbying expenditures at the state level over the 
past few years suggests that interest groups are expanding their focus beyond 
the federal government. Sarah Laskow, Ctr. for Pub. Integrity, State Lobbying 
Becomes Billion-Dollar Business (Dec. 20, 2006), http://www.publicintegrity 
.org/hiredguns/report.aspx?aid=835. 
 186. Cf. Hills, supra note 58, at 16–21 (describing how state laws can influ-
ence and determine congressional agendas). 
 187. See TESKE, supra note 1, at 14–15. 
 188. See Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 1314–15. 
 189. Hills, supra note 58, at 27–28. Here we define a regulatory ceiling as 
setting a maximum level of regulation that is permissible, such as the strictest 
standard for a given water or air pollutant. See, e.g., Buzbee, supra note 1, at 
1558 (defining regulatory ceiling as “the maximum level of regulation or pro-
tection that any entity could issue”). 
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1. Establishing a Presumption Against Federal Preemption 
Maintaining diversity within a federal system requires 
that overlapping state and federal jurisdiction remain the norm 
and, accordingly, that assertions of federal preemption be used 
and applied sparingly. Our presumption against preemption 
operates differently depending on whether the issue is pending 
before Congress, a court, or an administrative agency. We con-
sider Congress separately in the next subpart. For the courts, 
we argue that judges should revitalize the moribund presump-
tion against federal preemption.190 If embraced, this “clear-
statement” rule would permit state laws to survive a preemp-
tion challenge unless the statute contained an express preemp-
tion provision or provisions in the federal and state laws con-
flict directly.191 This rule would not eliminate federal 
preemption, but instead sharply curtail its prevalence.192 Fur-
ther, by essentially cutting out court-created “implied preemp-
tion,” it would require interest groups seeking federal preemp-
tion to succeed unequivocally in the legislative process and 
thereby raise the bar for invoking preemption.193 This strategy 
has the added benefit of depoliticizing court rulings on preemp-
tion, which many commentators believe reflect judges’ political 
ideologies far more than the legislative intent of Congress.194 
 
 190. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 237 (1947); see also 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s Fe-
deralism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 462–63 (2002) (citing the Court’s 
failure, in recent years, to promote a presumption against preemption despite 
the preemption doctrine’s mandate); Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme Court’s 
Judicial Passivity, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 343, 364–68 (highlighting recent im-
plied preemption cases that run counter to the “clear statement” rule).  
 191. Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 
79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1425–27 (2001); see also CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL, 
THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CON-
STITUTION 115 (2004); Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 230 
(2000). 
 192. See, e.g., Ann E. Carlson, Federalism, Preemption, and Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 281, 305–07 (2003); Chemerinsky, supra 
note 4, at 1330–32; S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Repub-
lican Values, 71 B.U. L. REV. 685, 760–63 (1991). 
 193. In other words, consistent with the position urged by Professor Che-
merinsky, there would only be two circumstances in which state laws could be 
preempted: (1) where preemption is express in a statute, and (2) when federal 
law and state law are mutually exclusive. Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 
1329–30. 
 194. See, e.g., David B. Spence & Paula Murray, The Law, Economics, and 
Politics of Federal Preemption Jurisprudence: A Quantitative Analysis, 87 CAL. 
L. REV. 1125, 1159 (1999). 
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Assertions of preemptive regulatory authority by federal 
agencies should be similarly limited. In the absence of express 
congressional delegation, courts should apply a strict “hard 
look” level of judicial review to agency regulations that preempt 
state law or regulations.195 Under this approach, the National 
Highway Transportation Safety Administration’s asserted 
preemption,196 pursuant to the Energy Policy and Conservation 
Act (EPCA), of California’s greenhouse gas vehicle emission 
standards would not survive judicial review. Nothing in the 
EPCA expressly preempts the California rules and compliance 
with those rules and the EPCA is not in conflict. Moreover, the 
agency inferred preemption indirectly by arguing that the Cali-
fornia regulation is a de facto regulation of vehicle fuel economy 
standards, and thus runs afoul of the exclusive regulatory au-
thority that Congress delegated to the National Highway Traf-
fic Safety Administration (NHTSA).197 
2. The Unique Status of Preemptive Federal Floors 
An adaptive framework on its own does not dictate how the 
inevitable conflicts between state and federal policies should be 
resolved. Drawing on the lessons from public-choice theory, our 
goal is to develop rules that preserve the benefits of federal 
regulation without triggering the harmful feedback effects that 
would increase the attractiveness of the federal government for 
lobbying efforts and thus policymaking.198 These feedback ef-
fects are problematic because they threaten to enlarge the role 
of the federal government, and correspondingly, to erode state 
and local regulation, to the detriment of the adaptability and 
resilience of the federal system.  
To avert this dynamic, Congress should adopt a new draft-
ing principle against federal regulations containing an express 
preemptive “ceiling.” We define a ceiling standard as one that 
 
 195. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
463 U.S. 29, 42–44 (1983); Susan Bartlett Foote, Administrative Preemption: 
An Experiment in Regulatory Federalism, 70 VA. L. REV. 1429, 1432–33 (1984). 
 196. Average Fuel Economy Standards for Light Trucks, Model Years 
2008–2011, 71 Fed. Reg. 17,566, 17,668 (Apr. 6, 2006) (to be codified at 49 
C.F.R. pts. 523, 533, 537) (“A state’s adoption and enforcement of a CO2 stan-
dard for motor vehicles would infringe on NHTSA’s discretion to establish 
CAFE standards consistent with Congress’[s] guidance and threaten the goals 
that Congress directed NHTSA to achieve.”). 
 197. The federal government bases this argument on the assertion that 
currently the only way to satisfy the California regulation is by improving ve-
hicle fuel economy. Id. 
 198. See supra text accompanying notes 144–47. 
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preempts more stringent state environmental standards, as op-
posed to a “floor” standard that preempts less stringent state 
environmental standards.199 In advocating this position, we 
recognize that the result may be less diversity and experimen-
tation at the weaker end of state environmental standards. We 
nevertheless believe that this asymmetry is necessary to sus-
taining a dynamic federal system.200  
Our rationale follows from three central assumptions. 
First, the relative advantage of business and industrial inter-
ests in achieving favorable regulatory outcomes vis-à-vis envi-
ronmental interests at all levels of government cannot be se-
riously disputed.201 As other scholars have noted, business and 
industry’s greater financial resources, the focus and cohesive-
ness of its goals, and its hierarchical structure contribute to po-
litical success.202 These characteristics contrast with the rela-
tively diffuse nature of environmental interests and the paucity 
of resources available to pursue environmental regulatory ob-
jectives, especially given their technical complexity.203  
Second, we assume that virtually all interest groups would 
favor a federal rule of decision over a state-level rule. By 
achieving their preferred regulatory outcome at the federal lev-
el, an interest group takes advantage of “one-stop shopping,” 
thereby obtaining the benefits of its desired regulatory goal 
across the nation without the expense of participating in the 
political processes of each of the fifty states.  
 
 199. Within the category of “federal ceilings” we would include federal 
standards that impose a uniform standard. While these standards preempt 
less stringent standards, most importantly for our purposes, they also preempt 
more stringent state standards. See, e.g., Buzbee, supra note 1, at 1568–72; 
Engel, supra note 27, at 291; Glicksman & Levy, supra note 137, at 28–29. 
 200. Two recent commentators have argued for “asymmetric” treatment of 
floor and ceiling standards on somewhat different grounds. Professor Buzbee 
argues that given the high likelihood of agencies failing to regulate and the de 
facto complete absence of flexible “regulatory ceilings” (all existing laws have 
fixed, unitary standards that states cannot deviate from), regulatory ceilings 
should be strongly disfavored. Buzbee, supra note 1, at 1558–59. Professors 
Glicksman and Levy advance an elegant argument that is based on evaluating 
the impacts of five potential collective action problems (negative externalities, 
resource pooling, race-to-the-bottom pressures, the need for regulatory un-
iformity, and so-called not-in-my-backyard, or NIMBY, distortions). Glicksman 
& Levy, supra note 137, at 13–22. They conclude that ceiling preemption is 
only warranted where the need for regulatory uniformity is high and strongly 
supported or where NIMBYism is a dominant factor. Id. at 28–29. 
 201. Esty, supra note 6, at 597–98; Farber, supra note 128, at 61. 
 202. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 128, at 61. 
 203. Id. 
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Third, we assume that industry will be most firmly aligned 
and cohesive in its pursuit of federal ceilings, and generally op-
posed only by relatively weak environmental interest groups. 
We infer from this observation that federal ceilings provide the 
most ready access to federal regulatory power, as they favor the 
interest groups, business and industry, that have the upper 
hand in lobbying Congress.204 Federal ceilings will thus be both 
the most susceptible to public-choice distortions and potentially 
the most destructive of the diversity essential to a robust feder-
al system. We therefore apply a presumption against federal 
regulatory ceilings. 
This bias is inverted for federal legislation containing regu-
latory floors. While regulatory floors are favored by environ-
mental groups seeking more aggressive environmental protec-
tion than that provided by some states, these groups are 
universally considered weaker in the political process than 
their industry counterparts.205 Assuming environmental groups 
are the sole advocates of federal floor regulation, their ability to 
obtain the passage of pro-environment legislation will be li-
mited at best. For that reason, we do not see the need for a pre-
sumption against federal floors. The very difficulty of their pas-
sage will cabin the exercise of federal regulatory authority, and 
the likelihood that they will succeed in expanding the federal 
role beyond that desirable in an adaptive federal system will 
thus be low. 
A potential objection to this argument is that industry 
groups often support federal regulation, and particularly feder-
al floors. Professor Revesz, for instance, argues that, consistent 
with agency capture theory, most environmental legislation is 
enacted because of industry support, not over industry opposi-
tion.206 Standard economic rationales for industry support of 
environmental regulation include the barriers to entry that 
they create, rent seeking, the advantage regulations may create 
for industries with strong economies of scale, or the markets for 
new technologies created by environmental regulations that 
benefit certain industries—for example, pollution control or 
monitoring technologies.207  
 
 204. Buzbee, supra note 1, at 1590–92. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Revesz, supra note 33, at 571 (determining that industry-dominated 
accounts are “more plausible” public-choice accounts of environmental regula-
tion). 
 207. Id. at 571–74. 
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While we take issue with the accuracy of these public-
choice accounts,208 they do not undermine our conclusion. At 
most, federal minimum standards will be supported by a subset 
of industrial interests, such as companies that have already en-
tered the market or invested in technologies that meet an envi-
ronmental standard. Thus, because federal minimum stan-
dards will be opposed by other existing or prospective entrants 
to a given market, the industry lobby will be split, with some 
favoring the federal minimum standard and others opposing it. 
For this reason, we do not believe that industry support for fed-
eral minimum standards is likely to trigger negative feedbacks 
that threaten the federal system and, in any case, the struggle 
 
 208. The industry-dominated accounts of environmental regulation present 
only a part of the developmental history of any given federal environmental 
law. These accounts are effective in demonstrating how the final contours of 
the enacted statute benefit the competitive position of certain industries over 
those of their rivals. For example, many federal environmental statutes im-
pose more stringent standards upon new plants in particular industries, as 
opposed to existing plants. See, e.g., Clean Air Act New Source Performance 
Standards, 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (2000). Nevertheless, to the extent these accounts 
may claim that such competitive advantages were the genesis of the move-
ment to seek federal environmental regulation, we strongly question their ac-
curacy. For this to be true, the benefits to some firms of creating barriers to 
entry would have to outweigh the costs of compliance with whatever environ-
mental standard did apply even to existing firms.  
More likely, industries tend to get involved in statutory design only after 
it becomes clear that environmental regulation is likely. Take the case of stra-
tospheric ozone depletion and the consequent regulation of chlorofluorocarbons 
(CFCs) in the 1980s. Revesz argues that the Montreal Protocol, which provides 
global-level regulation of CFCs, “provides a powerful example of environmen-
tal regulation creating rents and barriers to entry.” Revesz, supra note 33, at 
572. This account relies on the assertion that the Montreal Protocol would not 
have succeeded but for the support of Dupont Chemical, which had developed 
chemical alternatives to CFCs. James Maxwell & Forrest Briscoe, There’s 
Money in the Air: The CFC Ban and Dupont’s Regulatory Strategy, 6 BUS. 
STRATEGY & ENV’T 276, 284–85 (1997). While certainly true, this description 
fails to examine why Dupont was spending precious research and development 
resources on identifying alternatives to CFCs in the first place.  
A more robust account would acknowledge that the looming threat of reg-
ulation and the powerful scientific studies linking CFCs to stratospheric ozone 
depletion were essential to Dupont’s decision to invest its research dollars in 
these new technologies. Id. at 277–79 (describing how calls for a ban on the 
use of CFCs in aerosol spurred Dupont to conduct research on alternatives to 
CFCs and how a drop in political pressure for comprehensive regulation 
caused Dupont to abandon its research program during the early 1980s). We 
see a similar trend now with companies like British Petroleum investing heav-
ily in alternative energy technologies because of the strong case for climate 
change and expectations that the company will stand to benefit when CO2 is 
regulated. See, e.g., Jad Mouawad, BP to Invest $500 Million on Biofuels at a 
Research Center, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2006, at C9.  
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for federal floor legislation will at least be a reasonably “fair 
fight.”209 We consequently see no reason to impose a presump-
tion against environmental legislation containing federal floors. 
3. Tempering Federal Regulatory Uniformity 
Dynamic federalism will sometimes have to give way to the 
need for regulatory uniformity, which may be extremely impor-
tant for certain industries.210 Federal environmental law con-
tains many examples of preemptive uniform standards, al-
though most involve commercial products. Examples include 
federal uniform emission standards for motor vehicles211 and 
warning labels for pesticides.212 One of the most common ra-
tionales for regulatory uniformity is efficiency.213 In short, 
manufacturers of goods distributed in a national market should 
not be required to comply with fifty different state standards 
applicable to the design or operation of their products. 
We recognize the value of uniformity, but believe the bene-
fits often will not warrant total preemption. Accordingly, we 
argue that in many cases a weaker form of preemption would 
yield better regulatory outcomes. The quintessential example of 
tempered uniformity is vehicle emission standards under the 
Clean Air Act.214 The statute empowers the EPA to establish 
national standards for emissions of pollutants from motor ve-
hicles.215 However, the EPA’s authority is subject to an excep-
tion, under which California alone, among all fifty states, is 
permitted to establish its own standards that may differ from, 
and be more stringent than, those of the EPA.216  
 
 209. Hills, supra note 58, at 26.  
 210. See Glicksman & Levy, supra note 137, at 13–14. 
 211. 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (2000). These standards impose nationally uniform 
standards except in California, which has adopted a more stringent standard, 
or in a state that has adopted California’s standard. See infra Part III.A.3. 
 212. 7 U.S.C. § 136v (2000) (requiring that labels for pesticide use and ap-
plication be uniform under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide 
Act). 
 213. See, e.g., Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 319 (1851) (“Whatever 
subjects of [the commerce] power are in their nature national, or admit only of 
one uniform system, or plan of regulation, may justly be said to be of such a 
nature as to require exclusive legislation by Congress.”); Buzbee, supra note 1, 
at 1610 (“[O]verlapping regulation can lead to confusion, high compliance 
costs, and a drag on otherwise beneficial activities.”); Engel, supra note 27, at 
369. 
 214. Clean Air Act § 202, 42 U.S.C. § 7521. 
 215. Id. 
 216. 42 U.S.C. § 7453 (2000). 
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California’s standards have been instrumental in promot-
ing innovation and dissemination of that innovation. In several 
instances, a new standard was established in California and 
then subsequently adopted by the EPA as a national stan-
dard.217 This process was later accelerated when Congress 
amended the Clean Air Act to allow any state to adopt stan-
dards promulgated in California.218 This change enhanced Cali-
fornia’s leverage with the auto industry and prompted many 
car makers to ensure that all of their cars met the California 
standards, as opposed to manufacturing separate “California 
cars.”219  
Tempered uniformity, we contend, should be replicated 
with respect to other environmental standards subject to blan-
ket federal preemption. However, a tempered regime need not 
privilege a single state’s standards in the manner that the 
Clean Air Act does. A number of potential variants exist accord-
ing to the number of states at issue and the nature of the regu-
latory authority delegated to them. A regime could, for exam-
ple, allow departures from a federal uniform standard for a 
consortium of states with respect to a particular area of com-
merce for which the states have recognized leadership in devel-
oping standards. Experimentation with a variety of regimes is 
warranted given the success of the California exception under 
the Clean Air Act. 
B. TWO STATES OF ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATING 
The importance of the structural presumptions set forth 
above will differ depending upon the context in which environ-
mental legislation is being debated. The history of environmen-
tal law in the United States suggests that the dynamics of en-
vironmental legislative action are roughly separable into two 
primary states: periods of incremental change and periods of 
major disruption.220 The former consist more or less of times of 
 
 217. Engel, supra note 54, at 170–72 (describing the impact of California 
regulations on the Clean Air Act). 
 218. Clean Air Act § 177, 42 U.S.C. § 7507 (2000). 
 219. Engel, supra note 54, at 170. 
 220. Drawing on a similar evolutionary model, Professor Elliott and his 
coauthors argue that “environmental law, like other statutory and bureaucrat-
ic law, grows, like a living thing, in response to forces internal and external to 
the legal system. Sometimes its growth is unrestrained, like a cancer. Under 
other conditions, legislation cannot survive at all.” Elliott et al., supra note 11, 
at 314; see also Repetto, supra note 128, at 3–4 (discussing the uneven devel-
opment of environmental policy). 
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business as usual in which environmental issues compete for 
legislators’ attention against myriad other issues at play in na-
tional politics.  
The latter consist of periods in which environmental issues 
have high political salience.221 This is typically precipitated by 
a major event or catastrophe, such as the spontaneous combus-
tion of pollutants in the Cuyahoga River in 1969, the Love 
Canal in the late 1970s, the Bhopal, India, tragedy in 1984, and 
the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989.222 Numerous scholars have 
acknowledged the importance of these dramatic events in 
prompting congressional action on statutes ranging from the 
Clean Water Act, to Superfund, to the Emergency Planning and 
Community Right-to-Know Act, and, most recently, the Oil Pol-
lution Act of 1990.223 One could argue that the terrorist attacks 
of 9/11 represent a cataclysmic event that has prompted, or 
provided cover for, federal retrenchment from aggressive envi-
ronmental regulation.224 The influence of major disruptive 
 
 221. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Panarchy and Adaptive Change: Around the 
Loop and Back Again, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 59, 66–67 (2005). Professor 
Buzbee describes these discontinuities in obliquely economic rather than polit-
ical terms, but the basic insight is the same:  
Despite contextual factors that lead to the waxing and waning of fed-
eral and state activism, environmental protection efforts will always 
be largely dependent on the more consistent trends and incentives at-
tributable to environmental federalism structures themselves. Some 
of these trends and incentives are not easily categorized as benefits or 
harms, but environmental federalism’s contemporary structures that 
provide for regulatory overlap and interaction do create some clear 
benefits, with some associated costs. Historically contingent factors 
can, of course, trump these more consistent structurally created pro-
pensities, but they are nevertheless important factors to consider in 
assessing how environmental federalism operates. 
Buzbee, supra note 52, at 120–21. 
 222. Karkkainen, supra note 221, at 66–67. 
 223. Id.; Ruhl, supra note 75, at 1428, 1447 n.164, 1460–62 (describing the 
wave of legislation in the 1970s as a republican moment or point of punctuated 
evolution). 
 224. Gary C. Bryner, The National Energy Policy: Assessing Energy Policy 
Choices, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 341, 395–400 (2002) (examining how the current 
“energy crisis” has been used to open up public lands to aggressive resource 
extraction, often at the expense of environmental laws and protection); Sharon 
Buccino, NEPA Under Assault: Congressional and Administrative Proposals 
Would Weaken Environmental Review and Public Participation, 12 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L.J. 50 (2003) (describing how the Bush administration has systemati-
cally sought to circumvent the procedural requirements of the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act); Glicksman, supra note 74, 768 (describing the dilution 
of the Endangered Species Act as applied to the testing of military weapons); 
Hank C. Jenkins-Smith et al., Explaining Change in Policy Subsystems: Anal-
ysis of Coalition Stability and Defection over Time, 35 J. AM. POL. SCI. 851, 
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events can therefore cut either way, for or against environmen-
tal regulation. 
The factors that prompt legislative action will differ mar-
kedly between these two states. We assume that public-choice 
dynamics will dominate during incremental phases, while high-
ly volatile political views will dominate during periods of cri-
sis.225 Disruptions will also occur at different scales, with some 
of purely local significance—say, a local contaminated site—
and others of regional or even national prominence (for exam-
ple, mercury pollution and climate change). We assume further 
that local disruptions will not receive sufficient national inter-
est to trigger passage of federal legislation, except for the 
preemptive variety, whereas problems with national implica-
tions may receive attention at all levels of government. 
Both legislative states are important to the federal system. 
Periods of turbulent legislative action may be compressed in 
time, but their impacts will be felt for decades. More to the 
point, most of the major environmental statutes were passed 
during the singular period of 1970s environmental legislat-
ing.226 Periods of relative stasis at the federal level are also im-
portant, but primarily because of diversity-destroying misa-
lignments that may exist between the federal and state 
governments. As we have seen, public-choice dynamics at the 
federal level may be used to preempt innovations at the state 
level that are prompted by localized disruptions or grassroots 
constituencies in the state.227  
Our three policy prescriptions are limited largely to periods 
of incremental change at the federal level, and they are justi-
fied with primarily this state of affairs in mind. During periods 
of disruptive change, the standard public-choice scenario ceases 
to be controlling, and all bets are off. In fact, we expect that 
these presumptions will be largely irrelevant. As we have seen 
repeatedly, Congress will do whatever it wants under the tur-
bulent conditions that often propel regulatory action. Recent 
examples of precipitous federal legislative action include the 
 
875–76 (describing how exogenous events like the 1970s energy crisis led to a 
relaxation of federal government regulation of oil and gas leasing on the outer 
continental shelf ). 
 225. Elliott et al., supra note 11, at 314 (describing the evolution of legisla-
tion as sometimes growing “unrestrained, like a cancer”). 
 226. Ruhl, supra note 75, at 1460–62. 
 227. See TESKE, supra note 1, at 11–12; Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 
1314–15. 
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Patriot Act228 and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.229 Of course, these 
political forces have the same overriding effect on application of 
the matching principle. Abstract economic arguments are un-
likely to sway politicians under tremendous pressure to re-
spond to the disaster of the day and to establish a name for 
themselves in the process. 
A multijurisdictional adaptive approach, as distinct from 
our specific policy recommendations, has advantages over the 
classical approach of the matching principle during periods of 
national-scale disruptive change. The standard benefits of fed-
eral regulation are well known—its national scope, economies 
of scale, technical sophistication, and speed relative to the time 
it would take for state legislative action to spread across the 
country.230 The scope of the federal government’s power thus 
has distinctive benefits in times of disruptive change.231 
The status of leading or concurrent state action during dis-
ruptive periods is perhaps less clear. Its benefits are illustrated 
by the recent surge in climate change mitigation regulations at 
the state and local levels of government.232 Current state and 
local efforts to mitigate climate change provide important tem-
plates for other states and the federal government. Few would 
dispute that we are better off when states take the lead in the 
absence of federal action. Thus, just as the federal government 
can operate as a backstop for state inaction, so too can the 
states play a crucial role in addressing even national problems. 
States may be particularly willing to do so during periods of 
dramatic change when standard economic models such as the 
matching principle are likely to have the least explanatory val-
ue. 
 
 228. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 8, 12, 15, 18, 20, 21, 31, 42, 47, 49, and 50 U.S.C.). 
 229. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 15 and 28 U.S.C.). 
 230. See Glicksman & Levy, supra note 137, at 11–22 (describing collective 
action problems found in state-level action and the ability of federal regulation 
to overcome these problems). 
 231. See Karkkainen, supra note 221, at 66–67.  
 232. See BARRY RABE, PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, GREEN-
HOUSE AND STATEHOUSE: THE EVOLVING STATE GOVERNMENT ROLE IN CLI-
MATE CHANGE (2002), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/ 
states_greenhouse.pdf; Linda Adams, California Leading the Fight Against 
Global Warming, ECOSTATES, Summer 2006, 14, 14–16; Kirsten H. Engel, 
Mitigating Global Climate Change in the United States: A Regional Approach, 
14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 54, 60–61 (2005); Rabe, supra note 21, at 423.  
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C. TWO EXAMPLES OF ADAPTIVE FEDERALISM AT WORK 
We conclude with two examples to illustrate some of the 
implications of an adaptive model of federalism. The first ex-
ample, brownfields, is largely local in its scope and situated in 
a period of business as usual.233 The second example, climate 
change, is a quintessentially international issue that arose dur-
ing a relatively placid period but has itself become a source of 
major policy disruption.234 
Both examples violate the matching principle. In the case 
of brownfields, which involve local industrial site contamina-
tion and economic redevelopment issues,235 the federal govern-
ment played an important role at two points. The federal gov-
ernment established the initial scope of liability under the 
Superfund statute236 for the costs of cleaning up contaminated 
industrial sites,237 and then in response to state initiatives, tai-
lored that liability to encourage the cleanup and redevelopment 
of underutilized brownfield sites.238 This pattern reveals the 
back-and-forth dynamic between the states and the federal 
government. 
Climate change inverts the brownfields fact pattern. State 
and local governments have taken the lead in addressing this 
global problem.239 In doing so, they have filled the regulatory 
gap left by the federal government’s failure to institute a man-
datory program for controlling greenhouse gas emissions.240 
State-level legislative actions have led to a proliferation of poli-
cies and regulatory regimes, ranging from purely symbolic to 
stringent command and control measures.241 In the process, 
they have altered the political debate at all levels of govern-
ment, and by raising public expectations and consciousness of 
 
 233. See Buzbee, supra note 51, at 2–3. 
 234. See, e.g., Peter Baker & Steven Mufson, Bush’s Climate Remarks 
Weighed for Policy Shift, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2007, at A1; James Kanter & 
Andrew Revkin, Politics Shift as Planet Heats Up, INT’L HERALD TRIB. (New 
York), Apr. 7–8, 2007, at A1; Micheline Maynard, Turnabout on Fuel Stan-
dards, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2007, at C1.  
 235. Buzbee, supra note 51, at 1. 
 236. 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (2000). 
 237. See Buzbee, supra note 51, at 53. 
 238. Id. at 40–42. 
 239. See supra note 232. 
 240. See, e.g., Engel, supra note 232, at 54–55; Glicksman, supra note 74, 
at 781–86. 
 241. See Glicksman, supra note 74, at 779–86. 
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the issues, created substantial political pressure for the federal 
government to act. 
1. The Evolution of Brownfields Legislation 
Brownfield sites are abandoned or underutilized industrial 
sites contaminated with hazardous materials.242 The location of 
many of these sites near urban centers or harbors renders them 
desirable for redevelopment.243 Many of them are abandoned or 
underutilized, in part because the presence of contamination at 
the site creates a risk of substantial liability for site cleanup 
pursuant to the federal Superfund statute.244 In the 1990s, 
business, environmental, and citizen groups mobilized to ad-
dress the growing brownfields problem, which was contributing 
to urban blight, depreciating the value of neighboring proper-
ties, and hampering economic development.245 Central targets 
of this movement were passage of regulations that would miti-
gate the potential for liability and ultimately passage of 
amendments to Superfund itself.246 
The process of brownfields regulatory innovation is a text-
book case of adaptive federalism. As Professor William Buzbee 
notes, the emergence of brownfields measures is “a history of 
copycat legislation, alternating innovations, and generally pa-
rallel legal coverage.”247 Under their parallel statutes, the 
states were the first to adopt brownfields initiatives that, 
among other provisions, protected innocent purchasers from 
cleanup liability and provided for incentives to promote volun-
tary cleanup that terminated or substantially reduced the like-
lihood of further liability.248 The EPA initially resisted the calls 
for reform.249 However, after being subject to severe criticism 
 
 242. Buzbee, supra note 51, at 3–5. 
 243. Id. at 5. 
 244. Id. at 6 (noting that “[e]nvironmental liabilities undoubtedly contri-
bute to Brownfields abandonment,” but cautioning that such sites “are the 
product of many interrelated phenomena, many of which are unrelated to en-
vironmental laws.”). Moreover, while brownfields may appear to be solely local 
problems, they are occasionally a source of interstate pollution, collectively 
implicating interstate hazardous waste management and influencing inter-
state competition for business. Id. at 24. 
 245. Id. at 13–16. 
 246. Id. at 12–13. 
 247. Id. at 26. 
 248. See id. at 15–16. 
 249. The one exception to this was a 1995 EPA regulatory amendment that 
exempted lenders and several other categories of potentially responsible par-
ties from Superfund liability. This was classic public-choice lobbying by a 
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and the threat of budget cuts, the EPA embraced the state-led 
initiatives, and ultimately worked to facilitate and build upon 
innovative state programs.250  
Professor Buzbee is careful to point out that “state acti-
vi[sm] is at least partially the result of preceding federal initia-
tives,” particularly the passage of Superfund itself.251 Buzbee’s 
point is that pressure can be asserted from below, at the state 
level, just as readily as it can be asserted from above, and that 
despite the early dominance of the federal government, the 
states were able to play a vital role in environmental regula-
tion.252 It is this alternating federal-state pressure, which takes 
advantage of differing local (or national) political, environmen-
tal, or economic conditions, that is critical to sustaining innova-
tive policy development.  
2. The Emergence of State Climate Change Initiatives 
Climate change illustrates further the predictive failures of 
the matching principle and the virtues of adaptive federalism. 
Because climate change is caused, in part, by human-induced 
greenhouse gas emissions from around the globe, climate 
change is widely regarded as the textbook example of a global 
commons problem that is best addressed at the national and in-
ternational levels.253 It therefore presents a relatively clean 
case for the matching principle, which predicts that regulation 
of greenhouse gas emissions at the state level is highly unlike-
ly.254 State-level regulation is disfavored, so the argument goes, 
because it risks triggering the migration of major greenhouse-
gas-emitting industries to jurisdictions that do not regulate 
such emissions, along with the jobs and other economic benefits 
that accompany these industries (the so-called leakage prob-
lem).255  
 
group of special interests dominated by investors and banks. Interestingly, the 
amendment was invalidated but was then revived and passed as a 1996 ap-
propriations rider. Id. at 14. 
 250. Id. at 41. 
 251. Id. at 55. Buzbee argues that it was the backdrop of strict federal lia-
bility that led business interests to seek state measures that would limit un-
certainty about liability. Id. at 53. 
 252. Id. at 66–67. 
 253. DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW 47 (2006) (“Perhaps the most striking example of a commons problem is 
climate change, since everyone on the planet has a stake and nearly every-
one’s activities contribute to the problem.”). 
 254. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 255. Esty, Governance, supra note 36, at 1555 (“Falling back to national-
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Yet in direct contravention of this reasoning, it is state and 
local governments, not the federal government, that have taken 
the lead on climate change policy initiatives. For example, Cali-
fornia is leading the way by capping the state’s carbon dioxide 
emissions256 and mandating vehicle greenhouse gas emission 
limits.257 Other states, especially in the Northeast, have also 
been active on climate change mitigation. The most significant 
action among them has been the creation of the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative,258 which establishes a cap and trade 
program that will ultimately cover greenhouse gas emissions 
from electric utilities located in eight states. 
Global climate change policy illustrates the power of the 
bottom-up dynamics that are characteristic of adaptive sys-
tems. Although the “wrong” jurisdictions from a static economic 
perspective, state and local initiatives can play an instrumental 
role in generating innovative policies and propelling change at 
higher levels of government. First, state actions bring much- 
needed public and media attention to climate change and its lo-
cal effects.259 Second, state and local governments prompt, al-
beit on a small scale, critical technological, social, and economic 
changes essential to mitigating climate change.260 Third, state 
and local governments, as the old saying goes, function as “la-
boratories of democracy” for parallel testing of initiatives in a 
 
scale intervention . . . invites free riding, holdouts, and inefficient spending of 
limited resources—and thus structural regulatory failure. At least from a 
theoretical viewpoint, inherently global problems demand concerted worldwide 
action.”); Robert Stavins, Policy Instruments for Climate Change: How Can 
National Governments Address a Global Problem?, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 293, 
323–24 (“On the domestic level, even the most cost-effective greenhouse policy 
instrument will be desirable only if the national target it seeks to achieve is 
part of an accepted set of international mandates. Because unilateral action 
will invariably be highly inefficient, any domestic program requires an effec-
tive international agreement, if not a set of international greenhouse policy 
instruments.”). 
 256. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38550 (West 2006) (seeking to reduce 
emissions of greenhouse gases generated in California by twenty-five percent 
by the year 2020 in order to bring California’s total emissions down to 1990 
levels).  
 257. Id. § 43018.5. 
 258. See Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Home Page, http://www.rggi 
.org/index.htm (last visited Apr. 28, 2008). 
 259. Engel, supra note 232, at 55–57 (noting that state action on climate 
change has received extensive media coverage). 
 260. Carlson, supra note 192, at 314–15 (observing that concentrating en-
vironmental innovation in a given state or states has the potential to take ad-
vantage of economies of scale and network effects that are critical to technolo-
gical innovation, such as those found in Silicon Valley). 
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range of contexts that then can serve as models for other juris-
dictions.261 Finally, action at the state and local level can feed 
back to the national level, as the threat of fifty distinct state 
laws regulating a single industry has, as in the past, the poten-
tial to prompt congressional action.262 
State and local government climate change initiatives also 
demonstrate the basic insight of an adaptive model. The di-
verse range of political, environmental, and socioeconomic con-
ditions found at the state and local levels is a critical, and so far 
undervalued, source of innovative policy development—
irrespective of the putative scale of the problem.  
Such initiatives also have a clear economic rationale that 
defies the leakage problem and the matching principle. Take 
the example of state-level renewable energy portfolio stan-
dards, which, because of the added costs and thus economic 
risks, ought to preclude state action. Yet, twenty-one states and 
the District of Columbia currently have standards that require 
energy suppliers’ portfolios to contain a certain percentage of 
renewable power.263 The socioeconomic rationale is simple—
there are counterbalancing economic and social benefits that 
accrue to the state.264 Even on purely economic grounds the 
benefits can be compelling. Renewable energy, for instance, is 
generally more job-intensive than conventional energy 
sources265 and, for states that import electricity from out-of-
state suppliers, investment in renewable energy can pave the 
way for a stepped-up intrastate energy sector.266  
Beyond the economic rationales, some jurisdictions, such 
as the coastal states in the Southeast, are much more vulnera-
ble to the potential impacts of climate change. Other states 
 
 261. Schapiro, Interactive Federalism, supra note 15, at 267 (noting the 
population and economic competition among states). 
 262. Engel, supra note 232, at 57 (describing the movement of policy from 
the state to the federal level as the “domino effect”). 
 263. For updates on state-level climate legislation, see Pew Center on 
Global Climate Change, http://www.pewclimate.org/what_s_being_done/in 
_the_states (last visited Apr. 28, 2008). 
 264. Indeed, the economic benefits of a renewable portfolio standard are 
often advanced as a rationale for maintaining or enhancing such mandates. 
See Barry G. Rabe & Philip A. Mundo, Business Influence in State-Level Envi-
ronmental Policy, in BUSINESS AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 265 (Michael 
Kraft & Sheldon Kamieniecki eds., 2007). 
 265. See, e.g., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., DOLLARS FROM SENSE: THE 
ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF RENEWABLE ENERGY 1 (1997), available at http:// 
www.nrel.gov/docs/legosti/fy97/20505.pdf. 
 266. See id. at 2–3; Carlson, supra note 192, at 314–15. 
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may have far less to lose economically, either because they are 
large enough players, such as California, or their industrial 
base would be only indirectly affected by regulation or might 
even benefit from it (for example, North Dakota and Vermont). 
Alternatively, the political leanings or ideological bent of a ju-
risdiction may place a high value on environmental protection 
and the citizens may be less concerned about a strict cost-
benefit rationale for setting environmental policies.267  
Climate change policy demonstrates how the local condi-
tions of a jurisdiction, broadly construed, select for different 
types of environmental policy. State and local government ac-
tions thus collectively generate a diversity of policy options. As 
the preceding examples illustrate, variation in local conditions 
allows diversity to be maintained in the federal system as in 
adaptive systems generally. At the same time, competition for 
limited legislative and administrative resources winnows out 
policies and experience leads to their refinement. An adaptive 
model of environmental federalism would sustain both over 
time, preferencing neither policy diversity nor efficiency. 
  CONCLUSION   
Our adaptive model provides a powerful framework for a 
dynamic conception of federalism premised on the parallel de-
velopment of environmental policies at multiple levels of gov-
ernment. By revealing the deficiencies of a one-sided focus on 
static optimization and the virtues of sustaining a diverse 
range of regulatory options, this Article has shown that a shift 
to a dynamic model of environmental federalism would enhance 
government responsiveness, policy innovation, and socioeco-
nomic adaptability and resilience to unpredictable environmen-
tal change. 
The implications of an adaptive framework are not solely 
academic. Over the past few decades, and especially during the 
current Bush administration, Congress and the executive 
branch have adopted preemptive measures at a historically un-
precedented rate.268 During the same period, the courts have 
 
 267. See generally Kirsten Engel, State and Local Climate Change Initia-
tives: What Is Motivating State and Local Governments to Address a Global 
Problem and What Does This Say About Federalism and Environmental Law?, 
38 URB. LAW. 1015 (2006) (discussing the unusual federal-state role reversal 
in formulating aggressive strategies to combat climate change). 
 268. Nivola, supra note 16, at 50 (“More preemptions were piled on after 
1970 than in the entire preceding history of the Republic.”); Rabe, supra note 
ADELMAN&ENGEL_4FMT 7/20/2008 8:35 AM 
1850 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [92:1796 
 
been facilitators in this movement, often inferring preemption 
from the penumbra of a statute.269  
These worrisome trends make it all the more important for 
policymakers and scholars to appreciate the unique virtues 
that a dynamic system of overlapping federal-state jurisdiction 
has for environmental policymaking. An adaptive model, as we 
have argued, provides a theoretical framework for making this 
case. Our hope is that it will help to persuade legislators and 
judges to reverse course on federal preemption and convince 
scholars of environmental federalism that a singular focus on 
the static model of the matching principle ought to be reconsi-
dered, if not abandoned altogether. 
 
 
21, at 417–20 (describing the Bush administration’s extreme centralization of 
environmental policymaking in the federal government). 
 269. Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 1314–15. 
